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1 1 (August 8, 2024)

handle is hein.crs/goveqhd0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Informing th leg sIative dabate si nee 1914 S August 8, 2024 U.S. Extended Deterrence and Regional Nuclear Capabilities One of the stated goals of U.S. nuclear weapons policy is to extend deterrence to over 30 U.S. allies and partners and assure these countries that the United States will come to their aid, including potentially by using U.S. nuclear weapons, if they are attacked. The 2010, 2018, and 2022 Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs), which are periodic assessments of U.S. nuclear policy, argued for strengthening extended deterrence and posited that such deterrence supported U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. The 2022 NPR stated: Allies must be confident that the United States is willing and able to deter the range of strategic threats they face, and mitigate the risks they will assume in a crisis or conflict.... Extended nuclear deterrence contributes to U.S. non-proliferation goals by giving Allies and partners confidence that they can resist strategic threats and remain secure without acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for, and conducts oversight of, U.S. deterrence policies and their implementation, as well as U.S. defense and other cooperation with allies and partners. Evolution of Extended Deterrence Since the beginning of the Cold War, as part of its participation in NATO's collective defense commitment enshrined in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the United States threatened to use military force, including the first use of U.S. nuclear weapons, in response to an act of Soviet armed aggression against Western Europe. Such limited U.S. nuclear use carried the possibility of escalation to an all-out nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union; U.S. policymakers deemed this a credible deterrent of potential Soviet attack. The United States also eventually provided assurances to several allies in Asia that it would back their security with U.S. nuclear weapons. Since the late 1950s, successive U.S. Administrations have expressed concerns about the security threats posed by the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. During the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the 1960s, several U.S. allies sought additional U.S. security assurances while pledging that they would not develop nuclear weapons. U.S. policy has thus sought to extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella over allies in Europe and Asia in part as a means to reduce the incentive for them to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Policymakers and experts in allied countries may debate the extent to which U.S. official statements, capabilities, and plans to defend them constitute a credible security commitment. If an allied government doubts the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, the government may respond by requesting additional U.S. security assurances or by improving its own perceived security through other means. These means may include the development of independent or cooperative nuclear weapons capabilities. After the end of the Cold War, the United States reduced its nuclear forces, including those stationed abroad, and narrowed the range of contingencies for which the United States would consider the first use of nuclear weapons. The 2010 and 2022 NPRs, which articulated a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. military planning, emphasized the importance for extended deterrence of U.S. and allied nonnuclear capabilities, such as theater missile defense, and the forward presence of U.S. conventional forces. Allied perceptions of U.S. security commitments may be sensitive to U.S. domestic debates about possible shifts in U.S. nuclear policy or posture. US. Regona Nudear Capab t es During the Cold War, the United States deployed various nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including capabilities that later were eliminated as part of U.S.-Soviet arms control and unilateral commitments, to allied countries. Today, the United States extends deterrence to its allies through forward-deployed nuclear weapons, U.S.-based aircraft capable of conventional or nuclear missions that could be deployed in a crisis, and strategic nuclear forces. (See CRS In Focus IF10519, Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces.) The primary stated purpose of U.S. regional nuclear deterrence capabilities is to deter the limited use of nuclear weapons by Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea, and those countries' nuclear coercion of U.S. allies and partners. Regional nuclear deterrence systems include the following: * Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA), including those operated by seven NATO allies as part of NATO's nuclear burden-sharing. The last three NPRs have supported transitioning from the F- 16 aircraft to the F- 35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Air Force is procuring the F-35 jointly with some NATO allies and other U.S. allies and partners. The DCA can carry the B-61 gravity bomb, which is deployed from some NATO bases under U.S. operational control. * The U.S. Navy deploys a low-yield variant of the W76 warhead (the W76-2) on the Trident II D5 submarine- launched ballistic missile, as per a requirement articulated in the 2018 NPR. * In 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a program to procure a nuclear-armed sea- launched cruise missile as per Section 1640 of the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 118-31). (See CRS In Focus IF12084, Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N).)

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