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May 8, 2024

Federal Reserve's Discount Window: Policy Issues

The failure of three large banks in the spring of 2023 put
the discount window (DW) of the Federal Reserve (Fed)
back in the spotlight. DW lending suddenly spiked,
reaching an all-time high of $295.7 billion. This In Focus
discusses policy issues raised by this episode. Congress has
focused on the DW in its oversight capacity, as evidenced
by a recent House hearing.
Background
The Fed was created in 1913 in response to a perceived
need for a lender of last resort (LOLR). The Fed fills this
role by making short-term loans to depository institutions,
such as commercial banks, through its DW. Typically, the
Fed's LOLR operations are minimal because banks can
borrow privately. But during periods of financial instability,
such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the COVID-19
pandemic, DW lending grew rapidly as private sources of
liquidity dried up.
To borrow from the DW, banks pledge assets as collateral,
temporarily converting illiquid assets into liquid reserves.
Banks that are adequately capitalized and are not poorly
rated by their supervisors use primary credit and can
borrow for up to 90 days with no questions asked. Poorly
capitalized or rated banks must use secondary credit, which
is shorter term and subject to close oversight. Seasonal
credit is also available for small banks to manage seasonal
inflows and outflows. The Fed sets the discount rate
charged for loans. Traditionally the primary credit rate was
set above market rates, but since the pandemic it has been
set at the top of the federal funds rate target range. The
secondary credit rate is still higher. In addition to the limits
on secondary credit, risks to the Fed are minimal because
loans are short term, must be repaid even if collateral loses
value, and are backed by assets worth more than loan value.
Polcy kSues
St gma
An effective LOLR is one where banks do not use the DW
in normal conditions and readily use it in times of financial
stress. Although DW lending has ramped up in crises,
policymakers express concern that stigma associated with
the DW reduces its use. Stigma may create reluctance to
borrow from the DW because depositors or other creditors
will view this as a signal that the bank is troubled and run
on the bank-a fear that is most likely to manifest during
stress periods when usage is desired. If true, stigma makes
the DW less effective at mitigating systemic risk.
The Fed discouraged DW use in normal conditions until
2003, when it reformed DW operations partly to reduce
stigma by removing moral suasion and by making loan
approval easier. The Fed now states that primary credit can

be obtained no questions asked for any purpose,
including arbitrage opportunities, such as to lend for
profit. Nevertheless, concerns about stigma remain. Despite
official policy, almost 40% of surveyed domestic banks
said supervisory disapproval made them reluctant to use the
DW. The Fed has promoted the idea that there should be no
stigma, but it has also tacitly acknowledged that stigma
exists by creating various untainted alternative lending
facilities and by convincing large banks to publicly
announce borrowing from the Fed during crises.
Stigma could be reduced by making DW borrowing
confidential, which it was until the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act
(P.L. 111-203) required the identities and terms of
borrowing to be publicly disclosed with a two-year delay.
Three-quarters of surveyed banks said these disclosures
discouraged them from using the DW.
Lending to Faihng Banks
Banks can fail because they are illiquid (they cannot access
cash) or insolvent (their assets are worth less than their
liabilities). The DW is meant to protect illiquid-not
insolvent-banks, which arguably did not occur in 2023, as
three banks borrowed from the DW and failed anyway.
DW lending to problem banks is meant to be limited
because they may use it to gamble for resurrection. Yet
the three large banks that failed in 2023 remained eligible
for primary credit until shortly before their failures. Post-
mortem regulator reports found that examiners did not
downgrade them as quickly as they should have: All three
were considered well capitalized by regulatory standards
until they failed. Although Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and
Signature failed very suddenly and unexpectedly, First
Republic's failure was more drawn out, and it was able to
borrow $109 billion through primary credit after
experiencing depositor runs that made its weakness a high-
profile story. It remained eligible for primary credit until
three days before its failure when the FDIC downgraded its
supervisory rating.
Although all DW loans to the failed banks were fully
repaid, the episode nevertheless raises concerns about the
effectiveness of limitations on lending to failing banks. It is
unclear whether the loans increased or reduced risk to the
taxpayer, notably in the case of First Republic. DW lending
might have delayed its inevitable failure, and resolving
banks at least cost typically requires a failing bank to be
resolved as soon as possible. Alternatively, DW loans may
have reduced costs by allowing for its more orderly
resolution, in contrast to SVB and Signature, which
required emergency guarantees of uninsured deposits.

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