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1 1 (December 04, 2020)

handle is hein.crs/govdcsk0001 and id is 1 raw text is: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Tests Updated December 4, 2020 Press reports in May 2020 indicated that officials in the Trump Administration had discussed whether to conduct an explosive test of a U.S. nuclear weapon. The United States has observed a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing since 1992, although it has maintained the ability to resume these tests at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS). Since 1993, it has used a program known as Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and effectiveness of its nuclear arsenal. By its own count, the United States conducted 1,054 explosive nuclear tests between 1945 and 1992. In 1992, Congress passed and President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment establishing a temporary and unilateral moratorium on underground testing of U.S. nuclear weapons (P.L. 102- 377, §507). The United States has been a party since 1963 to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, under which it is obligated to refrain from conducting nuclear weapons test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water. The United States is also party to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which bans underground nuclear weapons tests having an explosive force of more than 150 kilotons. After declaring its testing moratorium in 1992, the United States advocated for and participated in negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This treaty, which opened for signature in 1996, would ban all nuclear explosions. President Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification in 1997. The Senate rejected the treaty on October 13, 1999, by a vote of 48 for, 51 against, and one present. As of March 2020, 184 states had signed the CTBT and 168 had ratified it. For the treaty to enter into force, 44 specified states must ratify it. Of the 44 required states, 36 have ratified, three have not signed (India, North Korea, and Pakistan), and another five have not ratified (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States). In the years since the treaty opened for signature, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have conducted explosive tests. Although the treaty has not entered into force, each subsequent U.S. President has indicated that the United States will continue to observe its unilateral moratorium. The Trump Administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review says, The United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing. In June 2020, Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, said I am unaware of any particular reason to test at this stage. The zero-yield standard conveyed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty requires states to refrain from conducting any test that produces a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction of any kind. Such a reaction is necessary for a nuclear detonation. However, neither the CTBT nor the U.S. unilateral test moratorium prohibits subcritical experiments (i.e., those that do not produce a nuclear yield). The United States conducts these types of experiments at its Nevada National Security Site. The U.S. State Department has raised questions about Russia and China's compliance with the CTBT's zero-yield standard. In its annual arms control Compliance Report, the State Department assessed that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons-related experiments with more than zero yield in the past, although it could not confirm that they had done so in 2019. It also noted that China is pursuing activities at its nuclear weapons test site that might allow it to conduct such experiments in the future. Some analysts and experts following developments in China questioned this assertion, noting that the alleged activities at China's testing facility do not violate the CTBT. Moreover, they note that, if the United States and China ratified the CTBT and the treaty entered into force, the United States could then call for on-site inspections of test sites if suspected violations occurred. Other U.S. analysts view Russian and Chinese efforts as a reason for the United States to withdraw its signature from the CTBT and possibly resume explosive tests. d ockp w d In 1993, President Clinton signed two Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that affected the U.S. nuclear testing program. PDD-11 continued the voluntary moratorium and directed the Department of Energy to formulate a specific safeguard program to protect the U.S. capability to resume U.S. nuclear testing if needed. PDD-15 set the policy for the U.S. stockpile stewardship plan, which would allow it to maintain and sustain the nuclear stockpile under the moratorium or an eventual CTBT. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) produces an annual plan known as the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) that outlines the goals, programs, and projects intended to provide this high level of confidence in the stockpile (50 U.S.C. §2523). NNSA conducts subcritical experiments and uses other tools to maintain stockpile reliability without nuclear explosive testing. It also maintains the readiness to conduct an underground nuclear test, if required, to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the Nation's stockpile or if otherwise directed by the President.

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