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1 1 (July 20, 2020)

handle is hein.crs/govdaym0001 and id is 1 raw text is: July 20, 2020 Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms Since Russia's invasion offGeorgia in 2008, Russia has undertaken extensive efforts to modernize and upgrade its armed forces. In the years ahead, these efforts are expected to continue focusing on modernizing military equipment, as well as improving combatreadiness and coordination across service branches. Command and control, electronic warfare, recruitment ofprofes sional soldiers, force s tructule changes, and logistics also are likely to be priorities for development. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in understanding the extent ofRus sia's military modernization andreformefforts as they assess the nature of Rus sianthreats to the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and other regions. Russia's military modernization priorities are detailed in 10-yearplans called State Armament Plans (GPVs). GPV 2020, covering the years 2011-2020, focused on funding the Navy and Aerospace forces. The plan also prioritized increasing the military's professionalization and readines s-including through recruitment campaigns and snap military exercises. The latest plan, GPV 2027 (covering 2018-2027), prioritizes Russia's ground forces and improving its rapid reaction forces, including elite Spetsnaz, Naval Infantry, and Airbomeand AirAssault Troops (VDV). In particular, strengthening mobility and command and controlremains a focus, as well as implementing les sons learned from Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria-such as the importance ofreconnais sance and heavy artillery. Equipment procurement likely will continue to stress heavily upgraded legacy systems. The ability ofRus sia's defenseindustry to produce new systems is limited, and financial constraints likely will push procurement decisions toward cheaper but proven designs. Despite low oil prices and a negative economic forecast, Russia likely will prioritize funding GPV 2027 ($330 billion in 2018 dollars), which has more limited scope and aims than GPV 2020. Economic pressures may curtail ambitions for GPV 2027. A centralpriority for GPV 2027 is the developmentoflong- range and precision-strike capabilities. This includes sea and air-launched cruise missiles (3M-54Kalibr, Kh- 101/102), land-based short and intermediate-range missiles (9K720 Iskander-M, 9M729 Novator), air-launched b allis tic missiles (Kh-47M2 Khinzhal), and hypersonic missiles (3M-22 Zircon, Avangard). Russia has invested resources into developing long-range precision-strike capabilities in large part because it has long viewed the U.S. advantage in this area as a serious threat. Due to cost and technological challenges, it remains unclear whether Rus sia will be able to fully produce and deploy these systems. Russia's official authorized personnel strength is 1,013,628. The Russian Ministry of Defense in late 2019 stated the Armed Forces were 95% staffed, while experts estimate the actual number is lower. Two major goals of the reforms started in 2008 were a reduction in personnel strength and a focus on professionalization. Opposition fromthe military and recruiting realities meant those goals were scaled back. Subsequently, Ru s sia has relied on a hybrid mix of draftees on one-year conscription terms and volunteers under term contracts. Professional (contract) soldiers are prioritized for front-line combat and elite units. The Navy and Aerospace Forces have higher levels ofprofessional personnel due to technically demanding missions. Additionally, although the Rus sian Armed Forces have experienced some success in recruiting professional soldiers, poorretention rates mean that staffing goals remain unmet. The goalof425,000 profes sional soldiers by 2017 went unfulfilled; the goal has been revised to 476,000 by 2025. Additionally, efforts to create a Wes tem-style noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps have been abandoned, with junior officers filling NCO positions andprofessional soldiers instead focusing on fulfilling technically complexroles. Figure I. Russian Armed Forces Personnel Z. Source: IISS Military Balance 2020,Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. VDV, Spetsnaz, and Naval Infantry forces formthe core of Russia's elite, rapid reaction forces and are some ofthe most capable andmodernized units in Russia's military. They play a crucialrole in Russia's powerprojection capabilities, with many units having gained operational experience in Ukraine and Syria. Rapid reaction forces ale a focus for GPV 2027, under which they are to receive increased funding for professional troops and equipment. The VDV and Naval Infantry are expected to gain capabilities, such as tankbattalions and army air support, which would increase their ability to operate independently. Additionally, since2015 the VDV has soughtto expandits personnelnumbers andis likely to do so in the near future. A A '2 xa S 1,k

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