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1 [1] (June 19, 2019)

handle is hein.crs/govbadx0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Burma's Prospects for Peace in 2019 Updated June 19, 2019 The announcement on December 21, 2018, by Burma's Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, of a unilateral ceasefire in eastern (but not western) Burma has raised many questions about prospects for ending the nation's long-standing civil war. Some observers viewed the announcement as a possible breakthrough for the stalled peace process backed by Min Aung Hlaing and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi. Others saw it as a ruse designed to promote discord among Burma's various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), continue the military's campaign in western Burma, and possibly set the stage for Min Aung Hlaing's political ambitions to be selected as Burma's next President in 2020. Min Aung Hlaing's decision on April 30, 2019, to extend the ceasefire for an additional two months has done little to resolve the outstanding issues that are preventing an end to Burma's decades-old civil war. Some of the EAOs that previously were involved in the peace process have suspended their participation; other EAOs are preparing for an escalation in fighting once the ceasefire is over. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations backed the peace process, both financially and as a matter of policy. The lack of significant progress in the negotiations and the continuing escalation in fighting have raised questions in Congress about the effectiveness of U.S. policy in Burma. Intensified Fighting in 2018 In 2018, fighting between the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, and several EAOs escalated in Kachin and Shan States, and erupted in Chin, Karen (Kayin), and Rakhine States. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), fighting occurred in7 of Burma's 14 States or Regions in 2018 (see Figure 1). In Kachin State, the Tatmadaw launched an offensive against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) that resulted in the internal displacement of over 5,000 civilians by the end of 2018. According to some accounts, the Tatmadaw intentionally attacked civilians in villages, mirroring the attacks on Rohingya villages in Rakhine State in late 2017. In Shan State, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the combined forces of the KIA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) increased, while rival EAOs also clashed. As in Kachin State, the conflict has created thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The civil war was brought to western Burma's Chin and Rakhine States in 2018 when the Arakan Army (AA), an EAO established in 2009 to protect the Arakan (Rakhine) people from perceived oppression by the Tatmadaw, launched a series of attacks on security outposts and troops on patrol. The AA has stated it seeks to create an autonomous state in northern Rakhine State, similar to the one created by the United Wa State Army in Shan State. The AA is also fighting alongside the KIA, MNDAA, and TNLA in Shan State. Figure I. Map of Fighting in Burma in 2018 Conflict by State or Region Source: CRS; based on data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), accessed January 2019. Developments in 2019 As 2018 came to an end, the peace process appeared to be stalled. On December 12, 2018, the AA, MNDAA, and TNLA announced that they would cease all military operations if allowed to participate in the peace negotiations, from which they had previously been excluded. On December 21, 2018, the Tatmadaw released a statement indicating that it would cease all its military operations in Northern, Northeast, Eastern, Middle East, and Triangle Command regions-effectively Kachin and Shan States-until April 30, 2019. The ceasefire announcement did not include Western Command, which includes Chin and Rakhine States, where the Tatmadaw is fighting the AA. The Tatmadaw has since extended the deadline to June 30, 2019. Some observers believe that China pressured Min Aung Hlaing and some of the EAOs to accept the temporary ceasefire in an effort to advance Burma's prospects for peace. Other analysts warn that the apparent flexibility may be a ruse by the Tatmadaw to draw more EAOs into the negotiations, while allowing the military to focus operations against the AA in Chin and Rakhine State. These observers note that the Tatmadaw's statement does not announce any changes in the military's position on the terms for peace- )orts.congr

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