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Congressional Research Service
&~ Inforrning the legislative debate since 1914
Updated May 1, 2025
Defense Primer: Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications (NC3)
The Department of Defense (DOD) is replacing many
elements of the U.S. nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) architecture as part of the United
States' ongoing efforts to recapitalize its nuclear forces.
This architecture-composed of what some estimate as 204
individual ground, space, and airborne systems spread
across military services, combatant commands, and DOD
components-supports the President's exercise of nuclear
employment authority. (See CRS In Focus IF10521,
Authority to Launch Nuclear Forces.)
U.S. NC3 systems must operate at all times, including
during and after an attack on the United States, to sense and
assess the operational environment; facilitate planning and
decisionmaker conferencing; and transmit orders from the
President to U.S. nuclear forces: bombers in the air, ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) underwater, and
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in silos
across the Midwest. (See CRS In Focus IF10519, Defense
Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces.)
According to DOD, U.S. [NC3] is necessary to
ensure the authorized employment and/or termination
of nuclear weapons operations, to secure against
accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized access, and to
prevent the loss of control, theft, or unauthorized use
of U.S. nuclear weapons.
The 2010, 2018, and 2022 Nuclear Posture Reviews
(NPRs)-periodic executive branch assessments of U.S.
nuclear weapons policy-highlighted the importance of
modernizing NC3. According to April 2024 testimony of
then-Principal Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy Vipin Narang, the Biden Administration
requested $11.4 billion for NC3 architecture modernization
in FY2025. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimated in 2025 that DOD efforts to sustain and
modernize NC3 would cost $154 billion from 2025 through
2034. Through defense authorization and appropriation
legislation and hearings, Congress provides funding for and
oversight of NC3 sustainment and modernization.
Selected NC3 System Elements
Early Warning Radars
The Space Force operates a number of missile warning
radars to detect and track potential incoming ICBMs and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. These radars include
capabilities like the Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry
Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS), the
Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization
System (PARCS), and the COBRA DANE radar system.
These missile warning radars are periodically upgraded.
Missile Warning and Tracking
In 2011, the Space Force began deploying the Space-Based
Infrared System (SBIRS), a series of satellites and ground
systems to detect and track the launch of adversary missiles.
SBIRS satellites operate in geosynchronous (GEO) and
highly elliptical orbits to observe missile launches
worldwide. SBIRS is DOD's replacement of the 1970s
Defense Support Program satellites. The Space Force is
implementing the Next Generation Overhead Persistent
Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR) program to eventually replace
SBIRS. Next-Gen OPIR is composed of several GEO
satellites, several polar-orbiting satellites, and a ground
system. In May 2024 testimony, then-Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration Frank
Calvelli described Next-Gen OPIR as a bridge to enable
the eventual transition to a proliferated and resilient
missile warning and tracking architecture in low and
medium Earth orbits. The FY2025 budget request included
$4.7 billion for space-based missile warning.
Hardened Satellite Communications
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
constellation is a group of hardened communications
satellites operated by the Space Force. AEHF, first
launched in August 2010, replaced the Milstar constellation
from the 1980s. Paired with the Family of Beyond Line-Of-
Sight Terminals (FAB-T) command post terminals, AEHF
aims to provide assured communications for nuclear and
conventional forces. In February 2024 congressional
testimony, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Commander General Anthony Cotton stated that the AEHF
constellation is fully deployed, while the command post
terminals leveraging it are nearing fully-fielded status. The
Space Force is developing a new series of satellites under
the Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS) program to
eventually replace AEHF. The FY2025 budget request
included $1 billion for ESS research, development, testing,
and evaluation activities. According to Calvelli's May 2024
congressional testimony, the Space Force aims for ESS to
achieve initial operational capability by 2032.
integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment
The goal of the Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack
Assessment (ITW/AA) system is to integrate and collate
warning data from terrestrial and space-based sensors,
including ones detecting nuclear detonations, to assess
whether an attack is occurring against North America or
U.S. assets or allies. ITW/AA utilizes dual
phenomenology-a process that draws on data from two
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