46 Stan. J. Int'l L. 219 (2010)
Regime Type, Veto Points, and Preferential Trading Arrangements

handle is hein.journals/stanit46 and id is 223 raw text is: REGIME TYPE, VETO POINTS, AND
PREFERENTIAL TRADING
ARRANGEMENTS
EDWARD D. MANSFIELD* AND HELEN V. MILNER
I. WHAT ARE PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS? .........             ............220
II. THE EFFECTS OF REGIME TYPE AND VETO POINTS ON PTA FORMATION.........221
III. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES     ....................................224
IV.THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PTA RATIFICATION .......................225
V. THE KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: REGIME TYPE AND VETO POINTS...........225
VI.CONTROL VARIABLES            ........................................ .....227
VII. RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS         ...................       ......231
VIII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS           ....................................... .....235
IX.CONCLUSIONS             ............................................ ........236
Preferential trading agreements (PTAs) are proliferating rapidly. Scores of
these institutions have formed over the past half-century and almost every country
currently participates in at least one. By 2006, according to the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), nearly 300 PTAs were in force, covering approximately half of
the overseas trade conducted worldwide.' Why states have chosen to enter such ar-
rangements and what bearing the spread of PTAs will have on international affairs
are issues that have generated considerable controversy. Some observers fear that
these arrangements have adverse economic consequences and have eroded the mul-
tilateral system that has guided international economic relations in the post-World
War II era. Others argue that such institutions are stepping stones to greater multi-
lateral openness and stability. This debate has stimulated a large body of literature
on the economic and political implications of PTAs. Surprisingly little research,
however, has analyzed the factors giving rise to these arrangements. The purpose
* Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. Please contact the au-
thor at: emansfie@sas.upenn.edu.
B.C. Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University. Please con-
tact the author at: hmilner@princeton.edu. Both of the authors are grateful to David Francis, Raymond
Hicks, Rumi Morishima, and Stephan Stohler for research assistance.
I  Pascal Lamy, Foreword to OPENING MARKETS FOR TRADE IN SERVICES: COUNTRIES AND
SECTORS IN BILATERAL AND WTO NEGOTIATIONS xx (Juan A. Marchetti & Martin Roy eds., 2009),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res e/bookspe/open-markets e.pdf.
219
46 STAN. J. INT'L L. 219(2010)

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