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4 Lancaster B. 1 (1872-1873)

handle is hein.statereports/lancb0004 and id is 1 raw text is: 












Three Dollars a Year in, advance.        T
     Tfen Cents per Numbter.

   VOLUME IV.

   Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

   ADAM   DIETRICH  vs. PENN'A R. R. CO.

1. One who buys a Railroad ticket, is bound to inform
  himself of the rules and regulations of the Company
  governing the transit and conduct of its trains.
2. Passengers puichase tickets subject to the rules
  and regulations of the Company for running its
  trains, which rules must be reasonable.
3. It does not lie on the Company to bring home no-
  tice of its rules, in order to establish the terms of
  the contract of carriage.
4. A regulation that passengers purchasing special
  tickets at ieduced rates, must ride between points
  named on the ticket on a continous train, and not
  allowing them to stop off at intermediate stations,
  is a reasonable one.
  Error to  the Court of Common Pleas of
Lancaster County.
  May  Term, 1872.
  (For opinion of the Court below see BAR of May
13th, 1871.)
  DICKEY  and  REYNOLDS   for Pl'ff in Error.
  NORTH   and BRENEMAN for   Def'ts in Error.
  Opinion of the Court by AGNEW,  J.
  This was a judgment  of  nonsuit, and  the
question is, whether the plaintiff's evidence
disclosed a case for the jury. Dietrich, the
plaintiff was a drover, residing in Lancaster
County.   On the 11th of March, 1867, he pur-
chased a drovers' ticket from Philadelphia to
Pittsburgh, and took passage on the Fast-line
on the defendant's Railroad.  At Lancaster,
he got off, and next day (the 12th,)he resumed
his journey.  When   the conductor, Young,
came  along collecting fares, he declined the
plaintiff's ticket on the ground that he had
stopped off, and informed  him  such were
his orders. Young  told him he must  get off
at Landibville.  After  passing  Landisville,
finding him still on the train, Young told him
he must go off at Mount Joy. At  Mount Joy,
the brakesman  put him off, but Young,  who
observed the brakesman taking him across the
track, halloed at him not to put him  off in
that way; and told Dietrich to get on again.
He   was  then  carried to  Altoona,  wheie
Young's  portion of the route ended.  After
leaving Altoona, Hankins, the conductor from
Altoona   to Pittsburgh, came  around,  and
the  plaintiff exhibited his drover's ticket.
Hankins  refused it and put him off at Gatlit-
zin, at the next end of the mountain tunnel.
The  plaintiff got on without leave, and Han-
kins again  refusing his ticket, the plaintiff
paid his fare from Altoona to Pittsburgh.
  On  his cross-examination, the plaintiff stat-
ed that Hankins was  not rude or unkind, and
told him it was his duty to collect the fare or
put him off. Dietrich said to him, I want this
tested and I want you to put me off genteelly.
The  question is therefore simply upon a breach
of the contract for carriage, and depends on its


   Iancasi tr




LLIAM 1B. WILEY, PUBLISHER.

            JUNE 1, 1872.

 terms. Before  examining  the terms  of the
 ticket, it is proper to clear the case of some im-
 material matters. Stress is laid on the state-
 ment  of Wimer,  that the  restriction as to
 stopping off, was not intended for such men
 as he, who shipped stock over the road every
 week.  This clearly has no influence whatever,
 in ascertaining or interpreting the terms of
 the ticket; h  afterwards  purchased   from
 the proper ticket agent. Wimer  was a mere
 freight agent, whose duty had no relation to
 the sale of tickets, but was confined to giving
 the required certificate to entitle Dietrich to a
 drover's ticket. When Dietrich went to Fran-
 ciscus, and asked him to make the ticket so as to
 stop off at Lancaster, Franciscus said, no sir.
 He admits that he knew of the restriction as
 to stopping off, which his request implies, and
 that he  had  seen  Young   refuse  another
 drover's ticket for this cause, and that in con-
 sequence he had been in the habit of buying a
 ticket from Philadelphia to Lancaster, when
 he wished  to stop off. The restriction, and
 his knowledge of it, if this were necessary, are
 plainly proved by himself. It is evident there-
 fore, that the plaintiff is thrown upon his ticket
 and the terms it imports or recognizes, as the
 evidence of his right of transit over the defend-
 ant's road.   The ticket is in these words:
 Drover's ticket. Not good on the  Philadel-
 phia Express.  Good only in the hands of Mr.
 A. Dietrich for one seat from Philadelphia to
 Pittsburgh. This   ticket good  only  until
 March 16th, 1867. Issued March 11, 1867. S.
 H1. Wallace, agent. On  the back is stamped
 Penna. R. R., March 11th, 1867. Philadelphia.
 Such tickets are evidence of the payment of
 the fare, and of the right of the holder or party
 named, as here, to be carried according to its
 terms, So far as they are expressed the terms
 are binding of course, but such tickets are not
 the whole contract, which must be gathered so
 for as not expressed, from the rules and regu-
 lations of the Company in running its trains.
 This is the generally received doctrine; with
 the qualification however, that these rules and
 regulations must be reasonable, and not con-
 trary to the terms expressed. See Johnson vs.
 The Concord R.  R. Co., 46  New  Hampshire
 Rep. 213 and cases there cited. The State vs.
 Overton, 4 Zabriskie 435; The Clev., Col. &
 Cin. R. R. Co. vs. S. 11. Bartram, 11 Ohio St.
 Rep. 437; Cheney vs. the Boston & Maine  R.
 R. Co., 11 Metcalf 121. With the same qualifi-
 cations of reasonableness it is also well settled
 that one who buy a ticket is bound to inform
 himself of the rules and regulations of the com-
 pany governing the transit and conduct of its
 trains. Thus he must  ascertain the train in
 which he is to go, the time of its departure and
 arrival, its stopping stations, his right to get
 off and get on, to resume his trips, &c. See
 the cases supra. If the law were otherwise a


railroad company could not regulate the run-
ning  of its trains to suit the interests of the
public or of themselves.  For  this purpose
some  trains must be fast, with few stoppages.
Others must be slow, with frequent stoppages.
Some  must be through trains and others local.
It is very clear that a passenger with a through
ticket cannot require a local train to carry him
through.  Nor  can he require a through train
to stop at a way station not in its time table,
His even having a stop-off ticket would not in-
crease his right to require the train to stop at
a station not in its time-table.
  It is evident that if in such cases the hold
ers of tickets can compel the trains to alter
regulations, they would be governed  by the
passengers, and  not by  the company.   An
excursion party on this principle, stopping off
at will, would overcrowd a subsequent train
to the discomfort of the proper  passengers,
and to the prejudice of the interests of the
company.    The  authorities, as well as the
reason of the thing, shows that the company
must make  its own regulations, and that pas-
sengers purchase their tickets suoject to thes
reasonable rules, and that it does not lie on the
company  to bring home notice of them in order
to establish the terms of the contract of carriage
In this case, the testimony  of the plaintiff
himself clearly shows that his ticket did not
entitle him to stop off at Lancaster, and if
notice were necessary that he knew that fact.
This brings us now to the question, whether
the face of the ticket, by its terms, imports a
right to stop off. The first noticeable and very
obvious thing, is, that the terms on the face of
the ticket are very restrictive. It is expressad
to be a Drover's ticket. It cannot be used
by any other than a drover.  Then  it is not
good on the Philad'a Express; it is good only
in the hands of Mr. A. Dietrich; no one else
can use it-then, this ticket is good only un-
til March 16th, 1867. It is therefore not good
after that day. It is restrictive from the be-
ginning  to the end, and  is wholly unlike a
general ticket which  any  holder may   use,
within any reasonable time, and yet even as
to such  tickets, the authorities are clear-
the right to stop off at intermediate unnamed
points, does not exist unless by means of stop-
off tickets, or the customary rules of passage.
The expressed terms of a drover's ticket being
all restrictive without exception, it gives no
countenance  to an implied right to stop off.
The  reason is obvious also-the ticket is sold
at less than half-price-that is, this was for
five dollars, instead of eleverl.  Its purpose is
special, and the restriction in time ( until the
16th of March,) was to prevent abuse  of the
benefit intended to be conferred on a particu-
lar class of persons. With all these restric-
tions on the face of the ticket, and in full view
of the purpose of the ticket, it is obviously im


P1ublication Office, No* 19 Norths D~uke
        Street, Law avter, -Pa.

                 NUMBER 1.

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