HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.
![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0319 and id is 1 raw text is: Frst, whether the assured are entitled to recover for a loss occasioned by the act
of the Coolies, in piratically and feloniously running away with the vessel (for the
murder of the captain and crew is, with reference to this present question, immaterial) ;
which piratical act caused the Coolies not to arrive at their port of destination, and
so prevented the sum insured from being earned,-if the cause of that act was the
unwillingness of the Coolies to be carried to the end of the voyage.
Second, whether, as the Coolies did not arrive at their port of destination, the
assured were entitled to recover, if the act which prevented their arrival was not
piratical and felonious, but was the taking of the vessel from the possession of the
master and crew, and running away with it by the Coolies, for the mere purpose of
being landed and escaping from the said vessel.
Thirdly, was the act of piracy or running away, as the case may be, not the cause
of the total loss of the sum insured, because the vessel was afterwards in safety, fit
and able and ready to proceed on the voyage, and convey the Coolies if they would
have gone, but they would not proceed on the voyage, and by reason of that refusal the
transport was not completed.
We are of opinion that none of these three circumstances affect the plaintiff's
right to recover; and consequently that both the pleas are bad.
The proximate, and not the remote, cause of the loss is [750] always considered,
according to the well-known legal maxim expounded by Lord Bacon, causa proxima
non remota in lege spectatur. The act of seizure of the ship, and taking it out of the
possession of the master and crew by the passengers, was either an act of piracy and
theft, and so within the express words of the policy, or, if not of that quality, because
it was not done animo furandi, it was a seizure ejusdem generis analogous to it, or to
barratry of the crew, falling within the general concluding words of the perils enume-
rated by the policy. It was a peril insured against, whatever the cause of the seizure
was, and though the cause of the seizure was no such peril, for the above-mentioned
maxim applies.
The only remaining question is, whether that seizure caused the total loss (not of
the ship, for that is not the subject of this insurance, but) of the sum insured, which
depended on the safe arrival of the Coolies. It is averred that it did, and must be
so taken, unless the circumstance that the loss would not have occurred if the Coolies
would have returned to the ship, as averred in the eighth plea, makes any difference.
We are clearly of opinion that it does not.
They did not return to the ship, and the total loss of the sum insured, primA facie
caused by the seizure of the ship and the escape'of the Coolies, never ceased to be
what we say it was, a total loss so caused ; because, presumably, it would not have
occurred if the ship had not been run away with ; for the Coolies, however unwilling
to proceed, would then have remained in safety in their prison, the ship, and been
delivered at their port of destination.
The running away with the ship was as much the cause of the loss as if the ship
had been seized and taken out of the possession of the crew by strangers, and then
abandoned, and the cargo had consisted of wild animals, who had escaped or been let
loose by them whilst they were [751] in possession, and could not be caught again
after the captors abandoned the possession ; or as if slaves (when lawfully the subject
of insurance), who had been conveyed in a vessel that was driven on shore by perils
of the seas, and by reason thereof escaped ; the perils of the sea would be the cause
of a total loss of the subject insured. In both these cases, as in the present, a peril
insured against by the policy happened, and in both the consequence of that peril
was the loss of the subject insured. Therefore our judgment will be for the plaintiff.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
HILLS V.. MITSON. Jan. 26, April 22, 1853.-To an action on a promissory note the
defendant pleaded, that, after the passing of 1 & 2 Viet. c. 110, one H. being
indebted to Messrs. H. and others, and being in actual custody within the walls
of Horsemonger-lane Gaol on a judgment at the suit of 0., did, within 14 days
after such imprisonment, petition the Insolvent Court for his discharge under
that Act; and that, while the petition was pending, and in order to induce
Messrs. H. to cease from opposing, and not thereafter to oppose his discharge as
they had threatened, the defendant and 0. made the note in question, and
1.555
8 EX. 750.
HILLS V. MITSON](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0319&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)