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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0281 and id is 1 raw text is: one: and the case of Davey v.'Mason, Carr. & M. 45, has never been acquiesced in as
an authority by persons interested in the subject, and it was under discussion in Hart
v. Baxendale, 6 Exch. 769. The question there arose as to whether silk hose
were silks within the act. In the course of the argument (though that is not noticed
in the report) the court intimated a strong opinion that the ruling of Lord Abinger
in Davey v. Mason could not be sustained. The only doubt seems to be that raised
by the word being silks, in the plural, which seems rather to point to cloths made
of silk, in which sense, Webster observes the word [silk] has a plural, silks, denoting
different sorts and varieties, as, black silk, white silk, colored silks. If, therefore,
there were no other language in the act, I should be inclined to say silks meant cloths
made of silk. But I find other words in the act which are inconsistent with holding
it to be confined to the plural of silk. The object of the additional words, in a
manufactured or unmanufactured state, and whether wrought up or not wrought
up with other materials. As to the other parts of the ease, I entirely concur in
what has been said by my Lord and my Brother Crowder, and have nothing
to add.
BYLES, J. I quite concur with the rest of the court in their correction of the
impression I entertained at nisi prius. I felt myself governed by the case of Davey
v. Mason, Carr. & M. 45; but I now learn for the first time that the ruling in that
case has been reflected upon, and that the matter is to be dealt with as if it were
res integra. If so, I agree that the word silks in the statute must be held to com-
prehend silk wrought up into textile fabrics, cords, ribbons, &c. With regard to the
port-monnaies, I also agree with the opi-[262]-nions which have been expressed: these
were certainly more ornamental than useful. Upon the whole, I think a correct con-
clusion has been arrived at, and that the verdict must be entered only for the value
of the boxes,-111. 17s.
Rule absolute accordingly.
ANDREWS V. GARRETT. April 15th, 1859.
The plaintiff, a tailor, having furnished goods to the defendant's son (an infant) while
at Addiscombe, the defendant, repudiating all liability on his part, on the ground
that the goods were not necessaries, wrote to the plaintiff as follows :- Should
you think fit to keep entirely from him, by yourself or agent, and not trust him
any further sum, or molest him in any way, and he does not, through your influence,
introduction, or advice, contract any further debt, I will pay you one moiety, and
try to provide the means for him to pay the other. If you do not at once agree
to this, you are open to take any step you may think proper: but, in case you do,
1 wish to have the account sent to him here per return of post.-The plaintiff sent
the account, but did not in terms accept the proposal contained in the above letter,
though he did not in fact molest the son: and some months afterwards he caused his
attorney to write to the defendant intimating his willingness to accept from him
one half his claim, but reserving to himself his rights against the son for the remain-
ing half :-Held, that these letters did not constitute such an agreement as to entitle
the plaintiff to sue the father for the moiety of the account.
This was an action upon a special agreement. The first count of the declaration
stated, that, before and at the time of the making of the promise of the defendant
thereinafter mentioned, one Newson Dunnell Garrett was indebted to the plaintiff in
a certain sum of money, to wit, 691. 10s. 6d., and thereupon it was agreed between
the plaintiff, the defendant, and the said Ncwson Dunnell Garrett that the defendant
should become debtor to the plaintiff in and agree to pay to the plaintiff one moiety
of the said sum of money in which the said Newson Dunnell Garrett was so indebted
to the plaintiff as aforesaid, and that he should become such debtor in lieu and instead
of the said Newson Dunnell Garrett, and that the defendant should with the assent
of the said Newson Dunnell Garrett become such debtor and agree as aforesaid, [263]
and that the plaintiff should accept the defendant's so becoming such debtor and
agreeing as aforesaid in full satisfaction and discharge of the said debt so due from
the said Newson Dunnell Garrett to the plaintiff as aforesaid, and all the damages,
causes, and rights of action in respect thereof; and that thereupon, in consideration
of the said agreement, the defendant did. become such debtor to the plaintiff, and agree
456
ANDREWS V. GARRETT
6 C. B. (N. 6.) 262.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0281&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)