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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0246 and id is 1 raw text is: PISANI V. LAWSON
(id. 196), Bayly v. Mem'el (Cro. Jac. 386) : if it applies to the credit of others, it ought
to have been in writing. But if this action be maintainable, a plaintiff may, in all
cases, harass his debtor with two actions in respect of the same demand ; one for the
price of the goods; the other for the purchaser's misrepresentation of his own solvency.
Those actions might be pending at the same time, though the jury would have no means
of ascertaining what damages they should give in either till the result of the other was
known. Parties cannot vary their rights by substituting one form of action for another:
Jennings v. Rundall (8 T. R. 335).
Barstow, in reply. The difficulty of estimating the damages would not prove that
the action does not lie : that difficulty often exists in the case of an action against
a sheriff for an escape.
TINDAL C. J. It is unnecessary to advert to the objection which has been raised
to the declaration ; and I give no opinion on the point whether or not such an action
is maintainable; because it seems to me clear that this plea is an answer to the present
action. The stress of the argument for the Plaintiff is, that the sixth section of 9 G. 4,
c. 14, is confined to cases where the contract is required by the Statute of Frauds to
be in writing; and it is then urged that, as the Defendant might have bound himself
and partners without any written contract, he may be responsible for his representation,
though not made in writing. I think, however, that the sixth section is not confined
to cases under the Statute of Frauds, which is not mentioned in the act till afterwards.
The sixth section says, No action shall be brought whereby [89] to charge any person
upon or by reason of any representation, or assurance made or given concerning or
relating to the character, conduct, credit, &c. of any other person, unless such
representation be made in writing, &c. It appears by the declaration that the
representation, here, was made by the Defendant alone; that he was in partnership
with two others; and that the representation was that the firm was trustworthy; not
that he alone was, but that he and others were. If the representation had been con-
fined to the two others, there can be no doubt it would have been within the statute;
and it is not the less a representation of the solvency of the two because he adds himself.
I think, therefore, that this was a representation as to persons who are not parties to
this action; and that it was a representation as to the credit of others, within the
meaning of the statute.
Our judgment must be for the Defendant.
BOSANQUET J. I was struck, at first, with the observation that the object of the
statute was to give further effect to the Statute of Frauds, and expected to have found
a recital of that statute in the sixth section ; but it is not till after that section that
any mention of the Statute of Frauds occurs; and I think the present case falls within
the words and spirit of the sixth section. The declaration states that the Defendant
represented the firm as trustworthy. It is true, that he, being a partner, the goods
obtained upon the faith of the representation were delivered to him as well as to his
partners ; but it would be extraordinary if the statute should be defeated with respect
to representations as to the credit of a firm, because the party making them happens
to be one of the partners. I think that such a representation is a representation as to
the credit of others, within the meaning of the statute.
[90] COLTMAN J. I am of the same opinion. I think this falls within the words
and the spirit of the act, and I am not disposed to fritter away the effect of so beneficial
an enactment. The representation was, no doubt, a representation as to the credit of
the Defendant; but it was also a representation as to others, to the intent that they
might obtain credit for goods purchased.
MAULE J. having been of counsel in the cause, gave no opinion.
Judgment for the Defendant.
PISANI v. LAWSON. Nov. 13, 1839.
[S. C. 8 Scott, 182; 8 D. P. C. 57; 9 L. J. C. P. 12; 3 Jur. 1153.]
An alien friend, though resident abroad, is entitled to sue in the Courts at West-
minster, for a libel published concerning him in England.
The declaration stated that, before the time of the committing the grievances by
the Defendant hereinafter mentioned, to wit, on the 1st of January 1837, and from
thence continually until and at the time of the committing the said grievances by the
6 BING. (N. C.) 89.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0246&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)