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Ludlow v. Drummond Eng. Rep. 1007 (1486-1865)

handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0181 and id is 1 raw text is: LUDLOW V. DRUMMOND

an estate, parted with her security on the whole, and took a security on a part for the
same sum, in consideration of having a remainder over limited to her younger children,
it was held to be a conveyance for a valuable consideration. That case coincides with
this in two points; first, that it was a relinquishing of the [82] whole in consideration
of a part, and secondly, it proves that there may be other valuable considerations
besides money.
Cur. adv. vult.
MANSFIELD C. J. now delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a writ of quare
impedit against the Bishop of Exeter, and Edward Thompson May and Richard
Langdon, who have obtained from the bishop the institution of Langdou, upon the
presentation of May, to the living of Fremington.  The title of Charles Hill, the
Plaintiff in this action, depends on a deed executed to him by his father, and set
out in the declaration. I take no notice of what is pleaded by other persons, only
what is pleaded by May. His Lordship then recapitulated the substance of the first
plea, and observed that the next plea stated the same things, and further alleged fraud
in fact, on which issue was joined. The replication to the first plea is, that Samuel
May had no interest in the premises: to this there is a demurrer, and two or three
questions are made. The great objection and ground of demurrer to the replication
is, that it is just the same thing whether S. May had or had not any actual title; for
he gave up whatsoever he had, and therefore it is quite immaterial what he had. The
ground on which the Defendant proceeds is, that the deed of 1773 was a voluntary
deed without any consideration but love and natural affection, and therefore void
against a purchaser for a valuable consideration by the stat. of Eliz. That S. May is
a purchaser from C. Hill ; and therefore, being a purchaser, the voluntary conveyance
previously made from father to son, became void against him. Now on the general
doctrine that voluntary deeds, however reasonable, are void against a subsequent
deed in consideration of money, there can be no doubt; for very strong cases have
de-[83]-cided, that if a man after marriage make the most prudent settlement on his
wife and children, such a deed as every wise man must approve, if the father is
dishonest enough to sell it for money afterwards, be may. The question therefore is,
whether this is a release made for a valuable consideration. There can be no doubt
in general, that the giving up a right, without fraud, is a valuable consideration ; the
relessor parts with that, for which the other party may very reasonably give money;
but it is suggested on the other side, that this might be done fraudulently on the part
of the father to cheat the son. It might be sufficient to say we do not presume fraud ;
but that if there be fraud, it should be the subject of a plea; but it is exceedingly
difficult to discover how fraud could be committed here. The father might have sold
the advowson for a sum of money at once, and no doubt, if his object was to defeat
the estate, which he had before given to his son, unquestionably he would thereby
have acquired what he wanted : but it is not likely that he wished to give to May,
rather than to his son, the next presentation after that to which Cooke was entitled.
One cannot see what advantage he could get by this transaction, for he got no money;
we must therefore conclude that the release was intended for security to his son's title,
and that he thought it beneficial to his son's title to make this bargain. And in this
view of the case, the son will have the benefit of this release in his future right to the
advowson. The Plaintiff might have replied fraud in the father, if he would, and
might have gone to issue on it; but he has not. We are therefore of opinion that the
Defendant is entitled to the judgment of the Court.
Judgment for the Defendant.
[84]  LUDLOW AND WIFE, Conusors. DRUMMOND AND OTHERS, Conusees.
June 20, 1809.
A fine sur concessit may be levied where the intention is to pass several mesne
particular estates, and a reversion in fee.
Sellon Serjt. on a former day had moved that a fine sur concessit might pass,
which the parties had covenanted to levy, but which the cyrographer had refused to
allow, under the idea that this species of fine was not the proper fine to pass an estate
in fee. Sellon contended, that it was at the peril of the party what might be the
operation of the fine levied, and that the rare occurrence of a particular fine did not

1007

2 TAUNT. 82.

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