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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0022 and id is 1 raw text is: HALSEY V. HALES
voyages, or either as chief or other mate during three voyages, and delivered in to the
collector a certificate attested by the respective owner or owners; then the whole
is consistent with the argument used on behalf of the defendant, and the word
respective may be applied to the owners of the different ships in which the captain
has served. This is the construction which I conceive will best effect the purposes of
the Legislature, and will be most conducive to the benefit of the owners and the slaves.
And this is strengthened by considering that, if the Legislature had intended that
the owner of the ship in which the captain was about to be employed should certify,
they would not have inserted the word respective. On the whole therefore, though
this case is not free from doubt, I think that this is the true construction of this Act
of Parliament.
Lawrence, J. My opinion has fluctuated during the course of this argument. The
clause on which the question arises is very inaccurately drawn. The argument as to
the hardship of the case had great weight with me; the Act is to receive the same
construction now as if the question had arisen soon after the passing of the Act, and
no prudence on the part of the Master, could have guarded against the inconvenience
that has been pointed out of the owner of the ship dying before the certificate could
be obtained: but however we might wish to provide for every hardship that may
occur, we are bound to put that construction on the Act that the Legislature intended.
And on the whole I am of opinion that the construction that the Court has put on
this Act is the true one. No satisfactory answer has been given to the defeildant's
observation on the word respective. For though this is a general regulation of the
slave ships, the word ships in the plural number is not used in the prior part of this
clause ; if it had occurred, the word respective might have been referred to those
ships : but the word ship is there inserted, and to that respective is inapplicable ;
but if the word respective be applied to the owners of the different ships in which
the captain has before served, then it has an appropriate meaning. Some reliance
however was made by the plaintiff's counsel on the words a certificate in the
singular number : but that must be taken with reference to every part of the section ;
for all the three attestations together may form but one certificate of the captain's
having served three voyages, in the case where those three attestations are [194]
necessary. Then with regard to the penalty : if the plaintiff's construction were to
prevail the penalty could never be recovered, for the owner who was about to employ
the captain would of course give him a certificate in order to protect himself from the
penalty of the Act, and such a certificate would be no additional test of the captain's
qualifications; whereas the owners of the ships in which the captain has served are
not interested in giving a false certificate, and they have an opportunity of knowing
the truth of the facts contained in the certificate. Therefore I am of opinion that the
nonsuit ought not to be set aside.
Rule discharged (a).
Gibbs, afterwards suggesting that this was a case of considerable importance,
desired that the plaintiff might have an opportunity of putting this question on the
record, and it was agreed that a special verdict should be drawn up in order that
a writ of error might be brought.
HALSEY against HALES, BART. AND ANOTHER. Monday, May 8th, 1797. A. who
was tenant for life with remainder to trustees, &c. remainder to his first and other
sons in tail, remainder to himself in fee, suffered together with B. his only son
a recovery, and declared the uses to such person and for such estate, &c. as
they should jointly appoint; they jointly granted an annuity and appointed
and granted the lands to C. for a term of years in trust for the grantee-held
that this case came within the exception of the Annuity Act. 12 East, 137.
12 East, 272.]
[Referred to, Eccles v. Cheyne, 1856, 2 K. & J. 681.]
A rule was obtained in the last term, calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why
the judgment which had been entered up should not be set aside, and the securities
given to secure an annuity delivered up to be cancelled.
(a) Vid. Law v. Hollingsworth, sup. 160.
I T. R. 19C.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0022&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)