Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S. v. Chadha
![handle is hein.journals/nyuilp18 and id is 1201 raw text is: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROLS ON
PRESIDENTIAL TRADE POLICYMAKING
AFTER I.N.S. V. CHADHA
HARoLD HONGJU KOH*
The current controversy over U.S. trade policy swirls
around the clash between the substantive policies of protec-
tionism versus free trade. In this article, I ask not what U.S.
trade policy should be, but rather who will make it? More
specifically, by what devices will Congress seek to influence
and oversee Executive Branch management of U.S. interna-
tional trade policy in the months and years to come?
One need not be a visionary to see that those who make
our trade policy inevitably determine its content. To put it
simplistically, if Congress consistently adopts a more protec-
tionist stance in trade matters than does the White House,
then greater congressional input into trade policymaking will
likely signal a more protectionist U.S. trade policy, and vice
versa. A reexamination of the tools currently available to
Congress to check, oversee, and influence presidential initia-
tive in trade policymaking seems particularly timely in the
wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha,' which not only struck down in one
fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than
the [Supreme] Court [had] cumulatively invalidated in its
history,2 but also swept away numerous legislative veto pro-
visions in five major international trade laws.3
After Chadha, observers asked whether the Court's rul-
ing had dramatically tipped the balance of power in interna-
tional trade matters away from Congress and toward the Ex-
ecutive, or whether the Court had simply eliminated one visi-
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. Parts of this article
were presented at the Fourth Annual Workshop on U.S-Canadian Rela-
tions, University of Western Ontario, April 4-5, 1986, and are closely con-
nected to the author's forthcoming chapter in the book growing out of
that workshop. See generally Koh, infra note 67.
1. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2. Id at 1002 (White, J., dissenting).
3. See provisions cited infra notes 46 & 49.
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Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S. v. Chadha
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