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55 J. Value Inquiry 1 (2021)

handle is hein.journals/jrnlvi55 and id is 1 raw text is: The Journal of Value Inquiry (2021) 55:1-20
https:I/doi.org/l 0.1007/s10790-020-09735-4
REGULAR PAPER
Speciesism, Prejudice, and Epistemic Peer Disagreement
Samuel Director'
Published online: 4 February 2020
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
1 Speciesism, Prejudice, and Epistemic Peer Disagreement'
Peter Singer famously argues that speciesism, like racism and sexism, is based on a
prejudice. As Singer argues, since we reject racism and sexism, we must also reject
speciesism. Since Singer articulated this line of reasoning, it has become a wide-
spread argument against speciesism.2 Shelly Kagan has recently critiqued this argu-
ment, claiming that one can endorse speciesism without doing so on the basis of a
prejudice. In this paper, I defend Kagan's conclusion (that one can endorse specie-
sism without being prejudiced). However, many philosophers have found Kagan's
argument deeply unsatisfactory; so, I advance an alternative argument, different
from Kagan's, in support of his conclusion. My argument runs as follows: I argue
that, if there is epistemic peer disagreement about a view, then the parties to this
disagreement cannot reasonably label each other as prejudiced in their beliefs about
this view. Then, I argue that there is epistemic peer disagreement about the truth
of speciesism, from which it follows that the parties to this disagreement cannot
reasonably label each other as prejudiced. Thus, one can affirm speciesism without
being prejudiced. If I am correct that one can affirm speciesism without being preju-
diced, then Singer's argument (that if one rejects racism, one must reject speciesism)
is unsound.
I would like to thank David Boonin, Chris Heathwood, Matthias Steup, Alison Jaggar, Alastair Nor-
cross, Alex Zambrano, Cheryl Abbate, Gagan Sapkota, Lenhardt Stevens, Bob Pasnau, Howard Nye,
Travis Timmerman, Jon Kim, Nate King, and audience members at the 2018 Central Division Meeting
of the APA for all of their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Emily Erickson for all of her
continued support.
2 For example, Jeff McMahan (Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice, Philosophy and Public
Affairs 25, no. 1 (1996): 3-35 The Ethics of Killing: Problems At The Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press., 2002)), Peter Singer (All Animals Are Equal, in T. Regan and P. Singer (ed.), Ani-
mal Rights and Human Obligations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 148-162, Animal Liberation.
Updated Edition (New York: Harper. 2009), Speciesism and Moral Status, Metaphilosophy 40, no. 3-4
(2009): 567-581), Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks (The Origin of Speciesism. Philosophy 71, no.
275 (1996): 41-61), and many more have advanced this argument.
E Samuel Director
Samuel.Director@colorado.edu
Philosophy Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309, USA

I_) Springer

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