About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

43 J. Value Inquiry 1 (2009)

handle is hein.journals/jrnlvi43 and id is 1 raw text is: The Journal of Value Inquiry (2009) 43:1-18 © Springer 2009 DOI 10.1007/s10790-009-9148-x The Merits of Dispositional Moral Realism KEVIN MICHAEL DELAPP Converse College, 580 East Main Street, Spartanburg, SC 29302-0006, USA; e-mail: kevin.delapp@converse.edu 1. Introduction One of the challenges facing modern defenses of moral realism is the difficulty of articulating a plausible moral ontology that avoids the extravagances of Platonism. Realists have unfortunately been reticent on this issue, rarely addressing the question of what it is that moral judgments are true in virtue of or what aspect of the world it is to which true moral judgments correspond. But if realists have been wary of confronting ontological issues, irrealists have been quick to supply ontological pictures on their behalf. One of the most damaging, but pervasive ontological accounts foisted upon realists has been a primary quality model of objects. For example, J. L. Mackie characterized realism as the view that moral values are somehow part of the furniture of the world. Irrealists are not to blame for this distortion. Objects are a familiar and relatively easily- articulated entity, and realists have simply not provided many explicit alternatives. However, silence here should not imply consent. One alternative model of realist values has been offered by John McDowell. McDowell suggests that we understand moral values as analogous to secondary qualities, which he interprets as dispositions to bring about certain experiences and perceptions under certain conditions. McDowell's theory has been subject to many concerns and objections. If successful, though, it has the advantage of clarifying how realist values could be belief-independent while still preserving some connection to human sensibility. After revisiting McDowell's analogy, a version of the dispositional model of moral values will be defended here. One of the reasons such a theory has been resisted has been due to a misunder- standing of moral realism as a view that would have us deny any meta- physical connection between moral values and moral agents. Although moral realists are committed to the belief-independence of values, realists need to be cautious not to divorce morality too much from human nature.

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most