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14 J. Value Inquiry 1 (1980)

handle is hein.journals/jrnlvi14 and id is 1 raw text is: Articles FRIENDS DAN PASSELL Portland State University This paper offers a theory of friendship, tests it against some of the facts, and uses it to explain a paradoxical feature of the relation. Briefly, the theory is that the elements are liking, sharing, sympathy, and trust; the facts are that we make comparative judgments about friends; and the paradoxical feature is that there arc no special duties to friends. Philosophical interest in the subject comes perhaps from two sources: curiosity about the kind of concept friend- ship is, and the thought that friendship might have its own special obligations. Prudential interest arises from the conviction that much of the quality of our life lies in the kind of association we establish with other people. 1. Being friends is not merely being acquaintances. Acquaintances know each other. But what more is there to being friends? Siblings grown to adulthood, though long separated, still have memories in common, and from formative years. Fellow countrymen or townsmen have less than this, per- haps only experience of the same objects: having gone to the same school, having watched the same parade, or merely having spoken the same language. Still, something is shared, and enjoyed. But shared experience doesn't of itself make a friendship. A may trade stories or share memories with B, and enjoy himself, without taking B as his friend. For he may not like B all that much. Well, then, is liking each other sufficient? Not by itself. A and B may like each other and not be friends. I like the Dean; let us suppose he likes me. But we are not good friends; we don't share or seek to share experiences with each other. Still, though neither is sufficient, liking and sharing do seem to be necessary conditions of friendship. Must the liking be mutual? Suppose, for instance, that A likes B, but B doesn't like A in return. That is not friendship; not even if A thinks it is. Of course, if each thinks of the other as his friend, then that is usually enough reason to say that they are friends. But the connection is not a necessary one. For there is at least the logical possibility of two people thinking that they are friends but being mistaken. Preliminarily then, what we have is that for two people to be friends they must (a) like each other and (b) share experiences together. Are these con- ditions jointly sufficient? Perhaps. But isn't there something further, a matter of warmth or hitting-it-off, a pull toward intimacy that marks the difference between mere acquaintances and friends? Let us consider. J. Value Inquiry 14 (1980) 1-6. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1980 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers by, The Hague / Boston / London.

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