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36 J. L. Econ. & Org. 1 (2020)

handle is hein.journals/jleo36 and id is 1 raw text is: 
JLEO, V36N1 1


Lateral Moves, Promotions, and Task-Specific Human
Capital: Theory and Evidence

      Xin Jin*
      University of South Florida

      Michael Waldman
      Cornell University




      This paper studies the link between lateral mobility and promotions. The first part
      of the paper extends the theoretical literature by incorporating lateral moves into
      a job assignment model  with task-specific human capital accumulation. The
      model thus predicts that workers who are laterally moved in one period are
      more likely to be subsequently promoted and experience larger wage growth
      compared  with workers who are not laterally moved. In addition, workers with
      very high levels of education are less likely to be laterally moved compared with
      workers with lower levels of education. We test the model's predictions using a
      large employer-employee  linked panel dataset on senior managers in a sample
      of large US firms during the period 1981 to 1985. Our findings support the the-
      oretical predictions and show the importance of lateral mobility in wage and
      promotion dynamics. (JEL J31, M51)


1. Introduction
      Most  studies of careers inside firms focus on worker  movements   across
      different job levels, that is, promotions (see, e.g., Rosen 1982; Prendergast
      1993; Gibbons   and Waldman 1999). However, there is substantial evi-
      dence that  suggests that lateral mobility, that is, movements   between
      jobs at the same  job level, is very common.   For  example,  Saari et al.
      (1988) surveyed  1000 randomly   selected firms in the United  States and
      find that over 40%   of the organizations  use horizontal  moves  in their

        We  thank Kevin Hallock, Matthew Freedman, Benjamin Friedrich, Victoria Prowse,
      Damon Clark, Francine Blau, Lawrence Kahn, Richard Mansfield, Henry Schneider, the
      Editor, Rocco Macchiavello, two anonymous referees, and seminar and conference partici-
      pants at Cornell University, Goethe University Frankfurt, Seoul National University,
      University of Illinois, University of Leicester, University of South Florida, University of
      Toronto, the SAEe conference, the Royal Economic Society conference, the SOLE confer-
      ence, the NBER Summer Institute, Personnel Economics, and the NBER Organizational
      Economics Group Meetings for helpful comments. Special thanks go to John Abowd and
      Michael Bognanno for help in obtaining the data used in the study. The data used in this
      paper are confidential and housed by the Cornell Restricted Access Data Center (CRADC).
        *Department of Economics, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA. Email:
      xjin@usf.edu.
      The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 36, No. 1
      doi:10.1093/jleo/ewz017
      Advance Access published August 27, 2019
      © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University.
      All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

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