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7 J. Conflict Resol. 1 (1963)

handle is hein.journals/jcfltr7 and id is 1 raw text is: Some reflections on the design of game theoretic models for the study of negotiation and threats MARTIN SHUBIK International Business Machines Corporation, Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Mathematical Sciences Department Some Problems in Modelling THE MEANING OF MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES One of the greatest sources of misunder- standing in the social sciences is the inability of many political scientists, sociologists, gen- eralists, and a great many economists and psychologists, to understand what is meant by a formal model, and to comprehend what constitutes a legitimate or an unsound use of that model. On certain occasions, more mathematically inclined social scientists may use simple examples to illustrate method- ology. Unfortunately, these examples can easily be misconstrued and given signifi- cance and content matter far beyond the initial intent of the expositor. Thus, in the past few years, there has been a rash of writing using two by two game matrices as a basis for discussions of threat and deter- rence policies. It is unlikely that any inter- national power situation can be adequately modelled for any purpose other than very simplified teaching by a two by two matrix. THE ACCEPTANCE OF AXIOMS AND THE INTUITION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST Very often controversies arise and achieve mammoth proportions in journals and de- bates where the individuals involved are arguing from a different set of axioms which neither is able to recognize. The less one understands the concept of a model, the more likely it is that futile arguments based on different sets of axioms will take place. In the past fifteen years, this has been ade- quately exemplified by the criticisms of and comments on the theory of games. The type of mathematical thinking exemplified by the work in the theory of games provides a use- ful methodology for the construction of models of many person decision-making processes. (However, this is by no means the only methodology.) THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-POLICING SYSTEMS Essentially, the type of game or social model needed for a study of threats and deterrence is that of a self-policing system. An enforcement mechanism must be present within the structure. A fundamental exam- ple of failure to have this is provided in the economic theory of welfare where the dis- cussion of one aspect of economics has almost completely ruled out an important parallel problem. Many economic theorists have written on welfare economics which deals with the desirability, consistency, and technological feasibility of economic states of society. Less attention, however, has been paid to illfare economics or the eco- nomic problems of enforcing any redistri-

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