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7 Int'l Env't Agreements: Pol. L. & Econs. 1 (2007)

handle is hein.journals/intenve7 and id is 1 raw text is: Int Environ Agreements (2007) 7:1-15 DOI 10.1007/s10784-006-9025-z The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The remarkable case of Norway Steffen Kallbekken - Jon Hovi Received: 13 March 2005/ Accepted: 21 September 2006/ Published online: 27 October 2006 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006 Abstract One of the ways to induce compliance is for an international enforcement mechanism to authorize the use of punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, such consequences should not cause significant damage to other (compliant) countries. The compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol fails to meet this requirement. The Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee is instructed to impose punitive consequences on a non-compliant country that will have considerable adverse welfare effects for compliant countries as well. Using a numerical model, we show that in the case of Norway, the welfare effects can actually be worse if another country is punished than if Norway itself is punished. Keywords Compliance enforcement General equilibrium modelling International institutions Kyoto Protocol Punitive consequences 1 Introduction The Kyoto Protocol provides specific targets for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases in the so-called Annex I (i.e., industrialized) countries. These targets are supposed to be met in the first commitment period, which begins in 2008 and ends in 2012. However, in some countries current emissions are significantly higher than their Kyoto targets.' Thus, there is a real possibility that not all parties are going to live up to their obligations for the first commitment period. 1 For example, in 2003 Norwegian emissions were 8% higher than in 1990, while Norway's Kyoto target allows emissions to be only 1 percent higher than in 1990. S. Kallbekken (E) CICERO (Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslo), P.O. Box 1129 Blindern, 0318 Oslo, Norway e-mail: steffen.kallbekken@cicero.uio.no J. Hovi Department of Political Science, University of Oslo and CICERO, Oslo, Norway 4P Springer

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