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6 Ind. J. Const. Design 1 (2020)

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         Minority  Vetoes in Consociational Legislatures: Ultimately Weaponized?

                                   DEVIN  F.J. HAYMOND*

       In societies emerging from or  at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival
       groups-called power-sharing-can be an appropriate arrangement to
       maintaining peace. But  how  can groups, who  are often emerging  from violent
       conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently
       shooting at them?

       A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block
       the government  from  harming  those groups' vital interests. But what sorts of
       change blocking mechanisms  constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power,
       and when  can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for
       ensuring consensus-based  support and the protection of minority interests, or are
       they merely political weapons that logjam governmental actions?

       This Paper  outlines the advantages and disadvantages of various minority veto
       design options in the context of consociational power-sharing arrangements, and
       inspects the formal legislative minority veto mechanisms  in Northern Ireland,
       Belgium,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Kosovo,  and  Macedonia.  Minority  vetoes can
       successfully protect minority groups' vital interests, but vetoes must be designed
       effectively in the consociational arrangement   in order  to avoid  the veto's
       weaponization, political deadlock, and increased tensions.

                                       INTRODUCTION

       Power-sharing  is seen as a critical political strategy for dealing with protracted conflicts:

rival groups are more  likely to accept peace  when  they are given  a share of the  power.1

Consociationalism, often equated with power-sharing more generally,2 is a theory of institutional

design for deeply  divided societies pioneered by Arend  Lijphart in the 1970s. The  aim  of

consociational power-sharing   is to  promote  and  incentivize  consensus-based  intergroup

cooperation  by  dividing power  among   rival identity groups. Consociationalism  has  four


* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2017, Indiana
University.
1 See generally BARBARA WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS (2002).
2 For the purposes of this Paper, the tenns consociationalism and power-sharing are used both together and
interchangeably.


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