Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
![handle is hein.journals/hilj43 and id is 47 raw text is: VOLUME 43, NUMBER 1, WINTER 2002
Terrorism and the Concept of
Armed Attack in Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter
Sean D. Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, nineteen persons of non-U.S. nationality
boarded four U.S. commercial passenger jets in Boston, Washington, and
Newark and, once airborne, allegedly hijacked the aircraft and crashed them
into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania country-
side.' Thereafter, the United States confirmed information that detailed cer-
tain evidence that connected these people to a terrorist group based in Af-
ghanistan (Al Qaeda) and headed by a Saudi expatriate (Osama bin Laden).2
The United States demanded that the de facto government of Afghanistan
(the Taliban) turn over the leaders of Al Qaeda to the United States, close all
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, and provide the United States with
full access to the camps to confirm their closure. The Taliban declined to do
so.3 On October 7, the United States informed the U.N. Security Council
that it was exercising its inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense by actions against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military
installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.4 On the same day, the
* Associate Professor, George Washington University
1. See Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hun-
dreds Dead, WASH. PosT, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al; David Firestone & Dana Canedy, EB.L Documents Detail
the Movements of 19 Men Believed to Be Hijackers, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 15, 2001, at A3.
2. See Press Release, 10 Downing Street Newsroom, Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the
United States (Oct. 4, 2001), http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?Newsld=2686; David E. Sanger,
White House Approved Data Blair Released, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 6, 2001, at B6.
3. Although the United States did not recognize the Taliban regime as the government of Afghani-
stan, and therefore had no diplomatic relations with the Taliban, the U.S. demands and the Taliban's
rejection of those demands were communicated through the government of Pakistan. See Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Taliban Refuses to Surrender bin Laden: U.S. Develops Options for Military Action, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 19, 2001, at Al. Further, President Bush issued the demands in a widely reported speech to a
joint session of the U.S. Congress. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.govlnewslreleasesl
2001/09/20010920-8.html [hereinafter Address to a Joint Session]. Se also John F. Harris & Mike Allen,
President Details Global War On Terrorists and Supporters, WASH. PoST, Sept. 21, 2001, at A1.
4. Letter from the Permanent U.N. Representative of the United States to the President of the U.N.
Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. Letter] (noting](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/hilj43&div=8&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
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