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36 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1 (2023)

handle is hein.journals/hhrj36 and id is 1 raw text is: 












     Economic Sanctions and Human Rights:

       Quantifying the Legal Proportionality

                                Principle




    Armin   Steinbach,* Jerg  Gutmann,** Matthias Neuenkirch,*** and
                            Florian Neumeier*   * * *



                                   ABSTRACT

The  benchmarks of necessity and proportionality are constants across different inter-
pretations of the proportionality principle. Both rest on empirical premises-with the
necessity test involving a prognostic effectiveness assessment and the proportionality
test assessing the actual effects of the sanctions. This Article examines these empirical
premises and inquires more generally into the potential, and limitations, of quantita-
tive assessments in the application of international law. To that end, we employ
econometric techniques to explore the proportionality of U.S. sanction episodes between
1976   and 2012.   Our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions aimed at
human   rights improvements. Furthermore, the results refine the judgment of sanc-
tions' (un)proportionality by distinguishing the impact on specific types of rights; and
they inform the debate on unilateral versus multilateral as well as targeted sanc-
tions. More generally, our analysis can inform the debate on the application of pro-
portionality in the field of international law and we outline challenges in importing
quantitative standards into the proportionality assessment.

                                INTRODUCTION

   Sanctions  remain  a popular  tool of economic  leverage to conduct  foreign
policy,  with  the United   States and  the European   Union   (EU)  being  the
most  active users.1 In theory, economic   pressure on civilians translates into
pressure  on the government for policy change.2 However, a growing criti-
cism  of  this theory  is that economic   sanctions frequently  fail to achieve

   *  HEC Paris (steinbacha@hec.fr)
   **  University of Hamburg, University of Freiburg, and CESifo (jerg.gutmann@uni-hamburg.de)
   ***  University of Trier and CESifo (neuenkirch@uni-trier.de)
   ****  ifo Munich, LMU Munich, and CESifo (neumeier@ifo.de)
   1. See Gabriel Felbermayr et al., The Global Sanctions Data Bare, 129 EUR. ECON. REV. 1, 1-2
(2020).
   2. See Toke S. Aidt, Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy, 59 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 426 (2021); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A Social Science of Human Rights, 51 J. PEACE
RES. 273 (2014); David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions: Lessons from

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