Efficient Matching: Reforming the Market for Law Review Articles
![handle is hein.journals/gmlr5 and id is 647 raw text is: 1997]
EFFICIENT MATCHING: REFORMING THE MARKET FOR
LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
Stephen R. Heifetz
INTRODUCTION
The welfare of an individual or a group often depends upon relation-
ships with others: corporations might seek to merge with other corpora-
tions; high school students often desire admission to a college; a man or
woman might search for a partner with whom to establish a long term
relationship. Frequently, the search for such utility-increasing matches is
quite competitive. There might be multiple corporations available for
possible mergers, and each of those available corporations might them-
selves search for the most lucrative partner. The high school student will
likely apply to many colleges, and some of those colleges might compete
with each other for that student. And the singles scene is notoriously
competitive as well. These are but a few examples of the common phe-
nomenon of pairing under competitive conditions, or matching problems.
In this article, I analyze a matching problem that has plagued the legal
academy: the matching of law review articles with student-edited law
reviews.
Although the plague afflicting the market for law review articles is
perhaps not of biblical proportions, the application of a theoretical frame-
work to even modest structural problems can often help us to understand
and resolve them. Understanding must precede reform, and in the case of
the market for law review articles, in which the structural problems
constitute more than a minor annoyance for regular market participants,
understanding the source of the problems can at least alleviate frustration
if a complete resolution is not forthcoming. Nevertheless, in the hope that
a reform proposal might spur a real world response, this article seeks both
understanding and resolution. As I will explain, the current matching
process in the market proceeds in a rather haphazard fashion that produces
suboptimal matches and high transaction costs. The market can be restruc-
tured to better aggregate the interests of those affected.
. J.D. 1996, Georgetown University; A.B. 1993, Stanford University. For their helpful com-
ments on various drafts, I would like to thank Peter Byrne, Avery Katz, Saul Levmore, James
Lindgren, Warren Schwartz, Mark Tushnet, and the participants in the John M. Olin Law & Eco-
nomics Workshop at the Georgetown University Law Center. For financial assistance, I am grateful
to the Olin Foundation. Most of all, I am grateful for my match with Kimberly Roeder Heifetz.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/gmlr5&div=35&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Efficient Matching: Reforming the Market for Law Review Articles
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