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13 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 5 (2002)

handle is hein.journals/eurjlwec13 and id is 1 raw text is: kLA               European Journal of Law and Economics, 13: 5-26, 2002
W     © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Manufactured in The Netherlands.
Ex Ante and Ex Post Allocation of Risk of
Illegality: Regulatory Sources of Contractual
Failure and Issues of Corrective and
Distributive Justice
MAHMOOD BAGHERI                                                            m.bagheri@city.ac.uk
Centre for Financial Regulation, City University Business School, London EC2Y 8HB, UK
CHIZU NAKAJIMA                                                             c.nakajima@city.ac.uk
Centre for Financial Regulation, City University Business School, London EC2Y 8HB, UK
Abstract
The pursuit of welfare objectives through contract law rules could be exemplified in the case of illegality
and subsequent nullity sanctions attached to a contract that violates certain regulatory rules. The effectiveness
of contractual allocation of risk of illegality (regulatory prohibitions), therefore, varies, depending on which
contract theory prevails. Maintaining the validity of a prohibited and failed contract, and allocation of the
relevant risks, is crucially dependent on whether we adhere to a welfare or rights-based theory of contract.
In this paper we argue that impossibility of ex ante and ex post allocation of risk of illegality is the logical
outcome of the adherence to a welfare theory of contract law, as maintaining even a minimum validity of
the failed contract would result in some welfare losses. According to this approach unjust enrichment could
not be rectified because it would diminish the optimal enforcement of welfare objectives. On the other hand,
and despite such prohibition and illegality, a rights-based theory would resist opportunistic and rent-seeking
behaviour and would ensure the validity of the contract and just allocation of losses and gains, which arise
from the failure of the prohibited contract.
Keywords: risk, regulation, illegality, contractual railure, rights, efficiency, distributive and corrective justice
JEL Classification: D6, D7, D8, KI, K12
1. Introduction
Whilst a contract is primarily a device for allocation of the risks unfolding in future,
there are contingencies, which contracting parties may not be able to plan for. They
have to either rely on contract law default rules or design some broad and general
terms for allocating unknown risks. However, in certain circumstances even the parties'
anticipation and contractual risk management plan may not be effective. A contractual
risk allocation clause could be rendered invalid if it is related to the allocation of risks
of illegality as often the effect of illegality nullifies the entire contract and, for social
reasons such as deterrence, any relief under such a contract is denied. Such treatment of
contractual obligations is reflecting a normative orientation of contract law under which

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