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3 Cogito: Multidisciplinary Res. J. 5 (2011)

handle is hein.journals/cogito3 and id is 1 raw text is: HOW RELATIVIST ARE SCEPTICS? Mjid Amini, Depart-ent of History & Philosophy, Virginia State University mamini@vsu.edu Abstract: It is not uncommon to see epistemological discussions of cognitive states such as beliefs to treat scepticism and relativism as epistemic siblings. Yet, despite appearances, the relationship between the two does not seem to be a simple matter of entailment or implication. Thus, the aim of the article is to chart out the contours of epistemic scepticism and relativism against the backdrop of ancient sceptical stance of Pyrrhonism and the contemporary sceptical position of Peter Unger. Keywords: Scepticism, Relativism, Pyrrhonism, Peter Unger. In his influential paper, 'The Legacy of Skepticism', Thompson Clarke puts forward an account of the nature of sceptical challenge against the greater context of our deep desire to philosophise and why the significance of scepticism cannot be summarily dismissed.1 Although he slights certain attempts such as idealism and commonsense realism as inadequate for escaping the snares of scepticism, he attempts to identify the problematic assumptions that undergird the construction of sceptical arguments and to resist their appeal in a way that does not lead to either dogmatism or idealism. Clarke contends that the way to deal with scepticism is not to discredit it by proving the veracity of epistemic states in one way or another, but to evince that the conditions required for the very formulation of the sceptical question cannot be met. Thus, he does not set out to show that we do indeed have knowledge in reaction to the sceptical question whether we do but, rather, to use a process of analysing what the sceptic's question itself presupposes in order to reveal that the question is in some way spurious or illicit: the philosophical claim to knowledge as well as its sceptical denial are ultimately 'a spurious fiction' that both should 'be erased from the books.' (Clarke 1972: 762) Clarke's analysis begins with the observation that the judgements and claims of knowledge that we make in 'plain' or ordinary life are 'immune from sceptical assault'. (Clarke 1972: 754) But, immunity is a mutual matter: to philosophise, as Clarke puts it, is 'to step outside the circle of the plain' (Clarke 1972: 760) and, thus, scepticism is similarly insulated from our ordinary practices of affirming and disconfirming knowledge claims. Such a reciprocal insulation protects ordinary life from philosophy and philosophy from ordinary life and G.E. Moore! This is indicated by the fact that one's occasional and legitimate assertion that one is not 1 For the impact of Clarke's thoughts on discussions of scepticism, see, for example, Burnyeat 1984: 226, Cavell 1979: xxi & passim, Nagel 1979: 19 & 27, Nagel 1986: 73, Stroud 1984: xiii & passim, Stroud 2000: xii &passim, and Williams 1991: 1 &passim. egit- Multidisciplinary Research Journal 5

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