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GAO-18-572R 1 (2018-08-02)

handle is hein.gao/gaobacpoo0001 and id is 1 raw text is: GAO U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 August 2, 2018 Congressional Committees Nuclear Supply Chain: DOE Has Not Used Its Enhanced Procurement Authority but Is Assessing Potential Use The U.S. government has identified a trend toward using a non-domestic supply chain for non- nuclear components of nuclear weapons at the same time that adversaries are becoming increasingly sophisticated, according to documents from the Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA has identified heightened risks for the supply chain for these components, including the possibility that a counterfeit or sabotaged component could cause a nuclear weapon to malfunction or that an adversary could gain access to DOE's classified information by exploiting the supply chain for the department's information technology infrastructure. NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that is responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile as well as for nonproliferation efforts.1 In keeping with its broader missions, NNSA is responsible for strategic management, safeguards, and security at government facilities where nuclear stockpile management and nonproliferation activities are performed. NNSA's nuclear security enterprise includes eight sites-government- owned research and development laboratories, nuclear production plants, and a test site. NNSA is responsible for overseeing production and procurement activities undertaken by the management and operating (M&O) contractors at these sites as well as for managing its own direct procurement activities.2 DOE, NNSA, and its M&O contractors have several tools available to help manage supply chain risks. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (the act), provides the Secretary of Energy an enhanced procurement authority.3 The authority allows the Secretary, in the interest of national security, to exclude a supplier who may present a significant supply chain risk from procurements of covered systems. Covered systems are primarily nuclear weapons, components, and items associated with the design, production, and maintenance of such weapons; items associated with the design and development of nonproliferation and counterproliferation systems; and certain information technology systems. 1For example, NNSA develops and tests new technologies to help the United States ensure against proliferation of nuclear weapons components and materials and monitor compliance with arms control agreements. 2M&O contracts are agreements under which the government contracts for the operation, maintenance, or support, on its behalf, of a government-owned or -controlled research, development, special production, or testing establishment wholly or principally devoted to one or more of the major programs of the contracting agency. 48 C.F.R. § 17.601 (2018). 3pub. L. No. 113-66, § 3113,127 Stat. 672, 1053 (2013) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2786 (2018)). GAO-1 8-572R Nuclear Supply Chain Page 1

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