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GAO-12-710R 1 (2012-07-13)

handle is hein.gao/gaobacggx0001 and id is 1 raw text is: GAO Accounftability * Integrity - Reliability United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548 July 13, 2012 Congressional Committees Subject: Defense Infrastructure: The Navy's Use of Risk Management at Naval Stations Mayport and Norfolk The recent financial crisis, emerging political unrest in nations around the globe, and the impact of significant natural disasters are causing organizations of all types and sizes to place increasing emphasis on robust risk management practices. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report1 states that risk management is vital to the Department of Defense's (DOD) success and that although it is difficult, risk management is central to effective DOD decision making. In an uncertain fiscal environment, while facing the threat of terrorism and natural disasters, the Navy must continually manage and assess the threats to and the vulnerabilities of its installations and assets. According to Navy officials, since the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has enhanced and updated its antiterrorism/force protection standards and physical security requirements for all DOD assets and installations. The Navy performs risk management at all levels of its headquarters and command structure for all of its operations and assets, including naval installations where nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and other high-value Navy assets2 are located. In Senate Report 112-26, accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (S. 1253), GAO was directed to conduct an analysis of certain matters related to the Navy's plan to establish a second East Coast homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, including the risks the plan seeks to address.3 Our reporting objectives were to determine the extent to which the Navy (1) conducts risk management to identify and assess the risk associated with its force structure and high- value assets, including the risk associated with homeporting nuclear-powered aircraft carriers on the East Coast, and (2) has taken actions to mitigate any identified risks. To gain an understanding of how the Navy conducts risk management to identify and assess the risk associated with its force structure and high-value assets, including the risk associated with homeporting nuclear-powered aircraft carriers on the East Coast, and the actions it has taken to mitigate any identified risks, we interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of the Navy and reviewed and analyzed relevant Navy documents and 1Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2010). 2The Navy describes the following as high-value units, which we refer to in this report as high-value assets: aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, ballistic missile submarines, guided missile submarines, attack submarines, and certain Military Sealift Command vessels. See Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3880.5, High Value Unit Transit Escort Operations, § 5(a) (June 15, 2010). We also use high-value asset to refer to an installation necessary for the support of military operations. 3See S. Rep. No. 112-26, at 241 (2011). GAO-12-71OR Defense Infrastructure

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