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EMD-78-104 1 (1978-10-06)

handle is hein.gao/gaobaaycj0001 and id is 1 raw text is: DOCUMENT RESUME 07377 - [C29780591 Quick and Secret Construction 0t Plutonium Reprocessing Plants: A Way to Nuclear Weapons Proliferation? END-78-104; B-151475. Octobe7 6, 1978. 19 pp. + appendix (7 pp.). Report to Sen. John Glenn, Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General. Contact: Energy and Minerals Div. Budget Function: Natural Resource3, Environment, and Energy: Energy (305). Organization Concerned: Departmen'. of Energy; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Department of State. Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs; Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works; ' Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Energy, Nuclear k:'-liferation and Federal Ser-kices Subcommittee. Sen. John Glenn. Authority: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242). P.L. 95-96. There has iteen much concern that nations with commercial nuclear poverplants but not possessing nuclear weapons might attempt to divert the plutonium contained in t)}e spent fuel discharged 'ron their powerplants to make nuclear weapons. Concerrs were increased by an Oak Ridge National Laboratory memorandum dited August 30, 1977, which provided a conceptual dtsiqn for a simple and quick plant for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. Findings/conclusions: The major issue raised by the memorandum was whether the reprocessing plant could be built and operated by nonnuclear-weapons nations without time constraints, quickly, and secretly. Without time constraints, many of these nations have, or could acquire, the technical capability to build and operate such plants. There was a wide divergence of opinion on how quickly such a plant could be built and placed into operation. The memorandum's estimnte of 4 to 6 months, although not highly probable, is credible under somn circumstances. GAO had limited access to information relating to the secrecy issue. Agencies involved believed that development and operation of a reprocessing plant would involve a substantial risk of detection. GAO noted, however, that there are limitations in the scope and applicability of detection activities. The possibility of quick construction of secret reprocessing plants is not a significant factor in deciding whether to allow reprocessing of spent fuel; the primary focus of U.S. policy is on the spread of legitimate reprocessing plants. However, the memorandum reemphasized the importance of deterring nonnuclear-weapons nations from diverting spent fuel. (HT )

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