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![handle is hein.gao/gaobaaxkh0001 and id is 1 raw text is:
DOCUdENT RESUZZ
06223 - CB1506633]
Determininq Requirements foz War Reserve Spares and Repair
Parts: Importance of the artime Planning Pzocess. LCD-78-407A;*
B-133396. June 6, 1978. 49 pp. + 3 appendices (7 pp.).
Report to Sen. John C. Stennis, Chairan. Senate Committee on
Appropriations: Defense Subcommittee; by Ell:r B. Staats,
Comptroller Genera-..
Isstke Area: Balance of War Reserves, Preposition*d Stocks, and
the Industrial Base. (806j.
Contact: Logistics and Comsunications Viv.
Budqet Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -
Military (except procurement 6 ccntractz) (051).
Orqanization Concei'ned: Department of Defense; Department of the
Air Force.
Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Arsed Sexvices;
Senate Conmitt.ee on armed Services. Sen. John C. Stennis.
Department of Defense (DOn) invesnments for aircraft
logistics cost billions of dollars annually. Logistics support
requires adequate numbers and various kinds of maintenance
people, facilities, and spare and repair parts to keep aircraft
operationally ready in peacetime and capakle of meeting artime
needs. The Air Force's total war reserve requirement for
secondary item spares and repair parts amounts to about $2.8
billion--SI.7 billion in assets and $1.1 billicn to t* funded by
fiscal year 1903. Findings/Conciusicns: In order to determine
war reserve parts requirements, proper planning, coordination,
and analysis are needed. The Office of the Secretary of tefensi
needs better coordination within, between, and among the
services. The Air Force needs better coordination cf uartine
planninq within its own department, especially among and within
the major commands. The Air Force has not conducted
comprehensive studies to find out the true wartime capability of
the C-5 or other aircraft. Wartime mission planning for
noncombatant aircraft should also have more careful analysis.
The Air Force has recently changed attritioe rates for six
tactical fighter aircraft# but overall attrition rates fcr the
fiqhters seem to be too low based on experience in past wars.
Recocmendations: The Secretary of Defense should strengthen
coordination of wartime planning activities and require the air
Force to: reevalu.te the ability of all aircraft to meet their
wartime mission before committing money for reserve Fart&,
training, and other loqstics support items; assess the impact
of the reduced strateqic airlift vissicn on other services which
depend on certain aircraft to move coetat equipment; take steps
to ensure that non-engaged aircraft have specific mission plans
duribq wartime; reevaluate the assumption that aircraft lost by
attrition will be immediately replaced by non-engaged aircraft;
incorporate the new attrition rates for strategic airlift
aircraft, reduce war reserve par-ts requirements for C-Bs and](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.gao/gaobaaxkh0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)