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![handle is hein.gao/gaobaaxfm0001 and id is 1 raw text is:
DOCUMENT RESUME
05929 - CB1526553] (Restricted/Confidential)
The Nuclear Weapons Joint Flight Test Program Needs Stronger
management Controls (Unclassified Digest of a Classified
Report). PSAD-78-98; 8-165546. may 30, 1978.
Report to the Congress; by 3ler G. Staatso Comptroller General.
Issue Area: Scieace and Technology: management and Oversight of
Programs (2004); military Preparedness Plans: military
Forces Readiness (805).
Contact: Procurement and Systems Acquisition Div.
Budget Function: National Defense: Weapon Systems i057);
National Defense: tonic Inergy Defense activities (053).
Organization Concerned: Department of Defense; Department of the
Air Force; Department of the Army; Department of the Davy;
Department of Energy.
Congressional Relevance: Congress.
Joint flight tests play a key role in determining the
combat readiness of deployed nuclear weapons and have been
instrumental in identifying and correcting serious problems that
were found only under operational flight conditicns. The Joint
Flight Test Program verifies that nuclear weapon systems
function correctly in the flight environment, confirms the
continued compatibility of Department of Defense (DOD) and
Department of Energy (DO3)-designed systems and procedures, and
provides input to the reliability assessment of the system. The
tests permit system components to be tested in an operational
environment, except those which would lead to radiation releases
or a nuclear detonation. Findings/Conclusions: DOB and DOD are
not realizing .maimum benefits from the program because
management controls are not clearly defined. DOD has not always
cooperated with DOE in providing carrier systems, missiles, or
aircraft when required for joint flight tests. Consequently,
fewer tests were performed than the minimum required by DOB to
accurately asseas the combat readiness of the remaining weapons
in the stockpile. Serious reliability problems may continue to
go undetected because some nuclear warhead components are not
tested, weapons tested are not selected from the total
population, and some test weapons and environments are not
representative. DOEs seapous reliability assessments are not as
meaningful as possible because large amounts of nonjoint test
data dilute recent test results. memoranda of understanding#
which were formulated by the Departments to goide program
operatiors, do not place responsibility for the timely and
proper performance of program operations or provide adequate
criteria to insure uniformity in testing and reliability
assessments. Recommendations: The Secretaries of DOD and DOE
should enter into a new agreement which: assigns
responsibilities and priorities for scheduling and timely
performance of tests, specifies procedures for meleuting and
preparing weapons for tests and for conducting tests to ensure](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.gao/gaobaaxfm0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)