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DOCUNEUT INSURE
05922 - ZB1566594]
(Review of Armyts Efforts To Develop TACFIRER] LCD-78-116;
B-163074. June '2, 1978. 10 pp. + 7 enclosures (28 pp.).
feport to Sen. Villiam Proxmire; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller
General.
Ii3sue Area: Aitomatic Data Processing: Design, Developaent, and
Installation of Software (106).
Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.
Budget Functron: aiscellaneous: Automatic Data Processing
(1001).
Organizatior Concerned: Department of the Arn7.
CongressionAl Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services;
Senate Committee on Armed Services. Sen. illiam Proxmire.
Wfter more than 10 years o. effort, the Army's Tactical
Fire Direction System (TACFIRl) was completed .n January 1978.
The Govfrmrient must now decide whether TACFIRBE should enter
full-sca., production hile communicationsw maintenance#
equipment, and software problems still exist. The TACPIRB
equipment tested during Operational Test III and scheduled for
product in is not the equipment the army plans to field; the
Army has identified new equipment based on updated technology as
potential replacement for certain TACFIRB components. Computer
programs for nuclear fire planning and corps artillery
operations need to be test3l and completed before TACVIRE is
fielded. The programs need to be rewritten because of changes
made to nuclear doctrine in July 1977, but rewriting haa not yet
begun. The TACFIRE coapiler, a program that converts programer
language to machine-readable instructionst contains at least 27
deficiencies that could disrupt computer operations and cause
data processing errors. The production decision should be
delayed to give the Army time to: complete software development;
correct known system problems and deficiencies; complete
development, testing, and evaluation of new equipment and
associated software; and assess the impact that the changes will
have cn the TACFIRE contracts, production schedules, and
eeployment requirements. The Secretary of Defense should direct
the Army to delay full-scale production of TACFIRE to permit the
program to be reassessed. (RRS)](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.gao/gaobaaxfi0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)