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DOCUMENT FESU!ME
04246 - (B3474704]
The Army's Proposed Close Combat Armored Vehicle Team.
PSAD-78-11; B-163058. December 12, 1977. 27 pp. + 3 appendices
(3 pp.).
Report to the Congress; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.
Issue Area: Federal Procurement of Goods and Services:
Definition of Performance Requirements in Relation to Need
of the Procuring Agency .1902).
Contact: Procurement and Systems Acquisition Div.
Budget Function: National Defense: Atomic Energy Defense
Activities (053) .
Organiz.ation Concer:ied: Department of Defense; Department of the
Army.
Congesional Relevance: House Committee on Irmed Services;
Senate Committee on Armed Services; Congress.
Several versions of a new main battle tank and infantry
combat vehicle have been under development since the early
196,s. B-cause of the need for cempatibility in a combined arms
team, the Army is developing , new main battle tank (XM-1) and
an infantry fighting vehicle and intends to operate these
vehicles as close to each other as battlefzeld conditions
permit. Findings/Conclusions: Differences in mobility and
survivabilixy between the XM-1 and the infantry fighting vehicle
could reduce their combat effectiveness as a team. A comparison
of the two vehicles showed that: the infantry fighting vehicle
has slower acceleration and less cross-country speed than the
XM-1, subjecting it to greater expcsure; the fighting vehicle is
2 feet hicher than the XM-1, making it easier to see; the
figh4ing vehicle's armor is inferior to that of the XM-1, making
it -asiar to destroy; the fighting vehicle's main gunsight is
easier to destroy, making it more susceptible to a firepower
kil; and the fighting vehicle's diesel engine is noisier and
more smokey, which could give away battlefield positions. While
some iifferences may be unavoidable, i question remains whether
4h- tactical doctrine covering use in combat can accomodate all
-he differences ir the -!wo vehicles and still maintain the
czmbat effectiveness of both. Test results revealed that the
ooeration of the fighting vehicle's main gun, its firing port
weapons, and a swim barrier added to enable it to swim aid
consilrrably to the vehicle's complexity Elements of the
vehiclp reed redesigning in order for it to perform effectively.
Pecommendations: The Secretary of Defense should ietermine:
whe-her, considering its advanced stage of development, the
inlicated design changes needed to make the infantry fighting
v>icle effective can s-ill be practicably made at an acceptable
c~st; and whel-hpr a tactical doctrine can be developed that can
a':commodate the incompatibilities between the fighting vehicle
and the Y'M-1 and still provide the effectiveness anticipated
from both. If *he design changes and tactical doctrine are](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.gao/gaobaawgw0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)