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GAO-11-123R 1 (2011-01-26)

handle is hein.gao/gaobaanwe0001 and id is 1 raw text is: GA 0 Acountabilty I Integrity * Reliability United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548 January 26, 2011 The Honorable Thad Cochran The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye The Honorable Carl Levin The Honorable John McCain United States Senate The Honorable C.W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable Norman D. Dicks Ranking Member Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives The Honorable Howard P. McKeon Chairman The Honorable Adam Smith Ranking Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Subject: Defense Infrastructure: Further Actions Needed to Support Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Relocation Plans According to Department of Defense (DOD) officials, the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (the Simulator), located at Air Force Plant 4 in Fort Worth, Texas, is an important asset for helping to protect U.S. and allied pilots and aircraft against the missile threats posed by adversaries. Most missiles use one of two electronic warfare technologies in order to pursue aircraft in flight and deliver an explosive warhead with the intent to inflict maximum damage. Small shoulder-launched missiles generally use infrared seekers that search for heat sources on an aircraft,' while more sophisticated air-to-air and larger surface-to-air missiles can use radio waves and infrared seekers to determine an aircraft's location in flight.2 DOD continually develops and tests countermeasures to protect U.S. and allied aircraft from both types of missile threats. 'Infrared missile systems' seekers use engine exhaust and other heat sources on an aircraft to follow it in flight. Infrared countermeasures attempt to create alternate heat sources as decoys to redirect the heat- seeking missile away from the aircraft. 2 In radio frequency missile systems, radio waves are transmitted either by an autonomously guided missile or from a ground-based tracking and command guidance system. These waves bounce off of the aircraft and back to the radio wave seeker on a missile or a ground-based receiver, which then analyzes these bounced-back waves to identify the range, altitude, direction, and speed of the aircraft in flight. Radio frequency countermeasures attempt to interrupt or deceive the enemy's radio waves and debilitate the missile, causing it to miss the aircraft. GAO-11-123R Defense Infrastructure

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