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DOCUM~ENT SESUME
02442 - [A1712696] (allW0l
(Another Look at the Readiness of Strategic Army Forces
(Unclassified Digest)]. LCD-76-57. June 9, 1977.
Report to the Congress; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller Generrl.
issue Area: Military Preparedness Plans (800).
Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.
Budget Function: Na'ional Defense: Depertmont of Defense -
f:Iitary (exceut procurement & contracts) (051).
Organization Concerned: Departmentt of Defense; Department of tbe
Army.
Cong:essional lelevance: Congress.
The Army mantainE strategic units in the United States
which are to be constantly available on short notice for
deployment in an emergency, either to reinforce and support
forces station-d overseas or to be deployed elsevhere to support
national commitments. Findings/Conclasions: It is doubtful taat
the strategic Army forces could deploy quickly and in a fully
combat ready condition. Much of the forces' combat essential
equipment was not kept up, although it was reported to be. As a
r-sult, a considerable amount of maintenance would be required
in a deployment I: make it combat ready. FundIng pLoblers
continue to constrain maintenance and tr&.:nin9 programs.
Shortages in the stock of cepair parts -ti.l texist and personnel
and training problems persist. Rpvisions tn the criteri& for
reporting personnel and training readiness are needed. Planning
for contingency deployments needs to be improved and
strengthened. During 1970-71, the diversion of resources, funds,
equipment, and personnel to South Vietnam contributed to the low
readiness o! the strategic divisions existent then.
Recommendations: The Army should conside: the folloving
alternatives: reducing the strategic forces to the number of
divisions that could be equipped, staffed, and supported with
the resources available; and retaining existing divisions but
concentrating the available personnel in selected organizational
components that vould !ie kept fully ready. The Secretary of the
Army should require that resources needed to deploy strategic
force units be compared to the avA ilability and capabilities of
ezisting transportation assets and -hould adjust deployment
plans accordingly. (Author/QM)](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.gao/gaobaacif0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)