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Congressional Research Service
Informing the legislative debate since 1914
Updated April 24, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
isolating the government.
In December 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a
major policy shift moving away from sanctions toward
engagement and the normalization of relations. The policy
change included the rescission of Cuba's designation as a
state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; the
restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts
to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to
Cuba by easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by the
Commerce Department).
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
2017 introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
the Obama Administration's efforts to normalize relations.
In 2019, the Administration has increased economic
sanctions significantly and taken other actions against Cuba
to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights
record and its support for the regime of Nicolis Maduro in
Venezuela. These include actions announced on April 17,
2019, allowing lawsuits to go forward against those
trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban
government and tightening restrictions on remittances and
nonfamily travel to Cuba. With these actions, U.S. policy
toward Cuba has again shifted to a policy of strong
economic pressure. In response to the Trump
Administration's increased pressures, Cuban President
Miguel Dfaz-Canel asserted, We Cubans do not
surrender.
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Dfaz-
Canel, who was serving as first vice president, succeeded
Rafil Castro as president, but Castro continues to head the
Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection of Dfaz-
Canel, now 58 years old, reflects the generational change in
Cuban leadership that began several years ago and marks
the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro
is not in charge of the government. While in power from
2006 to 2018, Rafil Castro began to implement significant
economic policy changes, moving toward a more mixed
economy with a stronger private sector, but his
government's slow, gradualist approach did not produce
major improvements to the Cuban economy, which has
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
In December 2018, President Dfaz-Canel backtracked on
implementing regulations that likely would have shrunk the
private sector and slowed implementation of a controversial
decree regulating artistic expression, actions that appeared
to demonstrate his responsiveness to public criticism and
his independence from the previous government. Dfaz-
Canel continues to faces two significant challenges-
moving forward with economic reforms that produce results
and responding to citizens' desires for greater freedom.
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
constitution in a national referendum. Among the changes
are the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
government operations; age and term limits on the
president; and some market-oriented economic reforms,
including the right to private property and the promotion of
foreign investment. However, the new constitution ensures
the state sector's dominance over the economy and the
predominant role of the Communist Party.
Government-to-Government Engagement. With the
restoration of relations in 2015, bilateral engagement
increased significantly. U.S. and Cuban officials held seven
Bilateral Commission meetings, the most recent in June
2018, to coordinate efforts on areas of engagement.
Officials negotiated numerous bilateral agreements,
including on such issues as environmental cooperation,
direct mail, civil aviation, maritime navigation, agriculture,
health, counternarcotics efforts, federal air marshals, cancer
research, seismology, meteorology, wildlife conservation,
animal and plant health, oil-spill preparedness and
response, law enforcement cooperation, search and rescue,
and the delimitation of the U.S.-Cuban maritime boundary
in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues were also
held on these and other issues including counterterrorism,
U.S. property claims, human rights, renewable energy and
efficiency, trafficking in persons, migration, and
cybersecurity. Given the current state of U.S.-Cuban
relations, the future of bilateral cooperation is uncertain.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
issued a national security presidential memorandum on
Cuba in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions. These
included restrictions on transactions with companies
controlled by the Cuban military, and the elimination of
people-to-people travel for individuals. To implement these
changes, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
amended the CACR and EAR in November 2017. The
regulations require people-to-people travel to be under the
auspices of an organization specializing in such travel and
prohibit financial transactions with entities controlled by
the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services.
The State Department issued a list of restricted entities in
November 2017, which was updated in November 2018 and
March 2019. Currently, the list includes 210 entities and
subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding companies
(including GAESA) and 47 of their subentities (including
the Mariel Special Development Zone), 99 hotels (with 28
in Havana), 2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old
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