About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

1 1 (January 12, 2024)

handle is hein.crs/govenzl0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional Research Service Informing the legislative debate since 1914 Updated January 12, 2024 Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations Military operations, both in peacetime and in war, are an inherently complex undertaking. One key to success, therefore, is a clear, unified chain of command. This enables senior leaders in the U.S. government-in particular, the President and the Secretary of Defense-to command and control military forces around the world. A (Very) Brief History of the Chain of Command The way the United States commands and controls its forces is in large part a product of an inherent tension between improving the effectiveness of U.S. forces, on the one hand, and preserving civilian control of the military, on the other. The experience of World War II convinced President Truman, among others, that a greater degree of coordination and integration between the U.S. military services was necessary to improve the conduct of military operations. Yet there was concern at the time that integrating these institutions might result in an overly powerful military staff element that could threaten the principle of civilian control of U.S. forces. The resulting compromise was to create a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), comprising all the military service chiefs, and headed by a Chairman serving as an advisory body only. As a corporate body, the JCS was specifically not designed to exercise command; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) had no command authority. The JCS did, however, have responsibility for establishing unified combatant commands, which were charged with executing military operations in different parts of the world by combining the capabilities of two or more military services. Different service chiefs were assigned executive and administrative responsibilities for these combatant commands, which gave them a mechanism through which they could influence ongoing military operations. By 1953, the authority to establish Combatant Commands (COCOMs) was assigned to the Secretary of Defense, although the relative ambiguity of the chain of command remained a feature of Department of Defense (DOD) operations until 1986. Perceived shortcomings in the U.S. chain of command led to demonstrable failures during several incidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The military services, in the view of many observers, failed to effectively plan or conduct operations jointly due to confusion over whether the military services or unified combatant commanders were ultimately in charge of operations. These incidents included the 1983 operation in Grenada; the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt (officially Operation Eagle Claw but often called Desert One); and the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act (P.L. 99-433), which mandated clarifications to the chain of command. The current command and control architecture for DOD is a product of these congressionally mandated changes. The Chain of Command Title 10 U.S.C. §162 specifies that the chain of command for military operations goes from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to Commanders of Combatant Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as an intermediary, transmitting orders between the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of Combatant Commands. Each Combatant Commander is a four-star Flag or General Officer, whose appointment is confirmed by the Senate. Unified Command Plan (UCP) The UCP is a classified executive branch document that articulates how DOD assigns responsibility for different missions and areas of the world. It is prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff every two years and approved by the President. Each UCP sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Congress is not included in this review process but does have visibility into issues affecting UCP development. It is through the UCP that DOD develops its global map of areas of responsibilities for its Combatant Commanders, reflected in Figure 1. Figure I. Combatant Commanders' Area of Responsibility ----U5. .. lNU _AIFIC COMMAWO Source: Association of the U.S. Army, The Army on Point: A Detailed Summary of Current Operations and Responsibilities (2022), August 5, 2022. Accessed November 28, 2022, https://www.ausa.org/publications/army-point-detailed-summary- current-operations-and- respon sibi I ities-2022.

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most