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1 1 (December 1, 2023)

handle is hein.crs/govenpc0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Con gressionaI Research Se informing I hej legs ive deb)ate sne I1914 Updated December 1, 2023 Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have successfully defended against and pushed back Russian forces in many regions, despite several apparent disadvantages. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict to date, as well as an ability to integrate Western security assistance into its military campaigns. The UAF continues to face obstacles to sustaining momentum-including losses in personnel and equipment-against Russian forces, however, as some Ukrainian officials candidly admit. Since early 2022, the Biden Administration and Congress have supported Ukraine's defense of its territorial integrity against Russia's invasion. The UAF's evolving condition may be of interest to Congress as Members evaluate whether to appropriate additional funds to support Ukraine and how to conduct oversight of U.S. policies and assistance. Person ne I Some observers note that the UAF's overall performance to date has been in part due to high levels of recruitment and motivation. High losses, however, pose a continued challenge to the UAF's ability to sustain effective operations. After Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in Ukraine's eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as the Donbas). This experience led to a large proportion of trained veterans among Ukraine's population. In 2022, these veterans and other volunteers (including foreign recruits) were quickly mobilized into Ukraine's new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve without the need for lengthy training. These units have been crucial in supporting regular UAF units, enabling the regular units to spearhead operations and counteroffensives. Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF reportedly has suffered high levels of casualties, lowering force quality. Losses are likely higher among regular UAF and Special Forces units, leading to a greater reliance on TDF and Reserve units. Many of these TDF and Reserve units also have sustained heavy casualties, further increasing the proportion of new recruits needed to regenerate forces. Unlike in the initial period of the war, when most recruits were veterans, at present most new recruits have little military experience and, as a result, take longer to train. Currently, the UAF is also experiencing growing recruiting challenges; Ukrainian officials have stated they intend to implement further mobilization plans (such as changes in conscription) in the near future. The UAF faces several challenges in deploying new personnel. First, at the time of the invasion, Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, which it previously had been seeking to develop along NATO standards. As described above, a high number of trained veterans, many with combat experience, mitigated to some degree the need for an established NCO corps to train and command new recruits. Losses among these veterans have increased the importance of developing a professional NCO corps and affected unit- level capability. Second, the UAF's need for immediate reinforcements creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training. To sustain combat operations in the current conflict, however, the UAF continues to balance training personnel to conduct complex operations and operate advanced weaponry with ensuring sufficient personnel are deployed at the front line. Finally, the UAF struggles to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. The lack of trained staff officers has in some cases led to tactical operations being coordinated and managed by higher-level command staff, leading to centralized and slower decisionmaking. Equiprnent The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet or Russian equipment. This variety of systems results in diverse capabilities across units and complicates maintenance and standardization. To date, the UAF has sustained significant equipment losses. Some UAF units appear to be operating without mechanized or motorized vehicle support, likely due to losses and limited replacements. Despite losses, Western security assistance and UAF resilience in repairing and maintaining equipment has been crucial to UAF successes. Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF almost totally reliant on Western assistance for artillery and rocket artillery systems and ammunition. Ukrainian officials have emphasized a need for long-range rocket and artillery systems to counter Russia's quantitative advantages in long-range fire. The UAF has demonstrated an ability to use qualitative advantages provided by Western security assistance (e.g., long-range precision fires) to mitigate Russian quantitative advantages in artillery. Ukraine's domestic defense industry produces a wide variety of weapons but has been unable to meet the country's full wartime demands. In addition, Russian forces

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