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Congressional Research Servke
Informing th legisIative deate sin co 1914
Taiwan: Defense and Military Iss
U.S. policy toward Taiwan has long prioritized the
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
To dissuade the People's Republic of China (PRC) from
using force to try to gain control of self-governing Taiwan
(which officially calls itself the Republic of China or ROC),
the United States has supported Taiwan's military
deterrence efforts. At the same time, the United States has
been strengthening its ability to deter PRC military
aggression in Asia. One challenge for the United States has
been how to deepen military ties with Taiwan without
triggering the conflict that U.S. policy seeks to prevent. See
CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Political and Security
Issues, for background on Taiwan's political status, the
unofficial relationship between Taiwan and the United
States, and the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.
Taiwan's Security Situation
Advantages
Taiwan has a technologically advanced military that is
tasked with deterring-and if necessary, defeating-PRC
military aggression against the archipelago. Taiwan enjoys
some strategic advantages, including geography and
climate. The Taiwan Strait is 70 nautical miles (nm) wide at
its narrowest point, and 220 nm wide at its widest. Extreme
weather conditions make the Strait perilous to navigate at
certain times of the year. Moreover, Taiwan's mountainous
terrain and densely populated coastal areas are largely
unsuitable for amphibious landing and invasion operations.
Taiwan's defense budget is expanding nominally and as a
share of gross domestic product; Taiwan's 2023 defense
budget of around U.S. $24.6 billion represents nearly a 10%
increase from 2022. To increase readiness, Taiwan's
leaders are extending compulsory military service and
looking to build robust civil defense capabilities. Taiwan's
defense relationship with the United States (detailed below)
confers political and military advantages as well.
Challenges
Taiwan faces an increasingly asymmetric power balance
across the Strait. The Communist Party of China's military,
the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a
decades-long modernization program focused primarily on
developing the capabilities needed to prevail in a conflict
over Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA now is
able, or will soon be able, to execute a range of military
campaigns against Taiwan. The PLA trains for operations
such as missile strikes, seizures of Taiwan's small outlying
islands, blockades, and-the riskiest and most challenging
campaign for the PLA-an amphibious landing and
invasion of Taiwan's main island.
Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-
military relations are strained for historical, political, and
Updated September 19, 2023
bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago's energy, food,
water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are
vulnerable to external disruption. According to some
observers, Taiwan's civil defense preparedness is
insufficient, and Taiwan's military struggles to recruit,
retain, and train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear
what costs-in terms of economic security, safety and
security, and lives-Taiwan's people would be willing or
able to bear in the face of possible PRC armed aggression.
In 2023, U.S. officials have said that a PRC invasion of
Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable. In February
2023, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William J.
Burns said that PRC leader Xi Jinping has instructed the
PLA to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion
[of Taiwan]. Now that does not mean that he's decided to
conduct an invasion in 2027 or any other year. But it's a
reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.
Previously, some U.S. officials had publicly cited specific
years in the mid-2020s as possible target dates for a PLA
attack on Taiwan, sparking alarm and reinvigorating
debates among experts and policymakers about how to
allocate limited time and resources to shore up Taiwan's
resilience to PRC military aggression.
PRC Gray Zone Pressure Against Taiwan
Below the threshold of an all-out attack, the PLA currently
is engaging in persistent, low-level, non-combat operations
that analysts say are eroding Taiwan's military advantages
and readiness. Such PLA gray zone actions include:
* large and increasingly complex exercises near Taiwan;
* near-daily PLA air operations in the vicinity of Taiwan,
including frequent sorties across the so-called median
line, an informal north-south line bisecting the Strait that
PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022;
* routine PLA naval patrols on Taiwan's side of the median
line, some as close as 24 nm from Taiwan's main island;
and
* unmanned combat aerial vehicle flights near and
encircling Taiwan, and reported flights of unmanned
aerial vehicles in the airspace of Kinmen, an outlying
island of Taiwan located next to the PRC coast.
The PRC government often ramps up these gray zone
activities following high-profile engagements between
senior policymakers of the United States (including
Members of Congress) and Taiwan. PRC leaders claim that
these engagements are evidence that Washington uses
Taiwan as a pawn to undermine and contain China, and
often respond with large-scale military exercises simulating
operations against Taiwan as a serious warning against
Taiwan separatist forces colluding with external forces.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.crs/govemwq0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)