![handle is hein.crs/goveixe0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional Research Service
Informing the Iegitive debate since 1914
Updated September 23, 2022
Iran's Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which the
council adopted on July 20, 2015, implements the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and contains other
provisions concerning Iran's nuclear program, Tehran's
development of missiles, and arms transfers to and from
Iran. In August 2020, the United States invoked the
resolution's snapback mechanism, which requires the
Security Council to reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted pursuant
to Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.
The JCPOA, finalized in July 2015 by Iran and China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (collectively known as the P5+1), requires
Iran to implement constraints on its uranium enrichment
and heavy water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor
Tehran's compliance with the agreement. Prior to the
JCPOA, these programs caused international concern
because they could both have produced fissile material for
use in nuclear weapons.
Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran received relief from
sanctions imposed by the European Union, United Nations,
and United States. On the agreement's January 16, 2016,
Implementation Day, the Security Council terminated
sanctions imposed by three previous resolutions on Iran; the
council adopted the first of these resolutions (1696) in 2006
and the last (1929) in 2010. The sole operative Security
Council resolution concerning Iran's nuclear program,
Resolution 2231, also stipulates that the council, which has
been seized of the Iranian nuclear issue since 2006, is to
end its consideration of the matter in 2025. The resolution's
snapback mechanism will then cease to be operational.
In May 2018, President Donald Trump issued a
memorandum stating that the United States would no longer
participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that
had been suspended pursuant to the agreement. Arguing
that subsequent efforts by the remaining JCPOA
participants, known as the P4+1, were inadequate to
sustain the agreement's benefits for Iran, the government
has undertaken some nuclear activities that exceed JCPOA-
mandated limits.
Iran's Nuclear Prograrm and Selected
JCPOA Provions
Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of
Iran's nuclear activities were exceeding JCPOA-mandated
limits; the government has since increased the number of
such activities. Tehran has also curtailed IAEA monitoring
of Iran's JCPOA commitments, which supplement Tehran's
obligations pursuant to its IAEA comprehensive safeguards
agreement and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
(See CRS Report R40094, Iran 's Nuclear Program:
Tehran 's Compliance with International Obligations, by
Paul K. Kerr.)
The NPT, which Iran ratified in 1970, includes prohibitions
on obtaining or producing nuclear weapons Comprehensive
safeguards agreements are designed to enable the agency to
detect the diversion of nuclear material from declared
nuclear facilities, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear
activities and material.
Iran has also ceased implementing the Additional Protocol
to its comprehensive safeguards agreement. Such protocols
increase the IAEA's ability to investigate undeclared
nuclear facilities and activities in nonnuclear-weapon states
by increasing the agency's authority to inspect certain
nuclear-related facilities and demand information from
member states. Pursuant to its JCPOA commitments, Iran is
required to implement provisionally its additional protocol;
Tehran is to seek ratification of the protocol by the Iranian
parliament no later than October 2023. Iran originally
signed such an additional protocol in late 2003, but stopped
implementing it in early 2006.
Moreover, the IAEA no longer monitors JCPOA
restrictions which supplement Iran's safeguards obligations
and prohibit Iran from engaging in a number of dual-use
activities which could contribute to the development of a
nuclear explosive device. Should the JCPOA be
implemented as envisioned in the agreement, most of its
nuclear-related restrictions will expire. In that case,
Tehran's nuclear program will be governed indefinitely by
Iran's obligations pursuant to the NPT, the government's
IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional
Protocol, and the dual-use restrictions described above.
U2N Security Council Resolution 223 1
(215 and Snpbc
In addition to its JCPOA-related provisions, Resolution
2231 imposes other requirements on Iran. For example, the
resolution restricts exports of missile-rated items to Iran
until October 2023; other restrictions concerning Iranian
imports and exports of conventional weapons expired on
October 18, 2020. Despite lacking a direct connection to the
country's nuclear program, previous arms restrictions, the
first of which were imposed by Security Council Resolution
1747 (2007), were part of a broad U.S.-led approach of
pressuring Iran to comply with relevant council resolutions.
(For more on the arms restrictions, see CRS In Focus
IF11429, U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions
Snapback, by Kenneth Katzman.)
According to Resolution 2231, a JCPOA participant can,
after notifying the Security Council of an issue that the
government believes constitutes significant non-
performance of [JCPOA] commitments, trigger an
automatic draft resolution keeping sanctions relief in effect.
A U.S. veto of this resolution would both reimpose the
suspended sanctions and end expiration of the conventional
arms and missile-related export restrictions, as well as
Security Council consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.crs/goveixe0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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