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1 1 (January 31, 2022)

handle is hein.crs/govegxk0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional Research Service Inforrning the legislative debate since 1914 Updated January 31, 2022 The Army's AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiatives Background The 2018 National Military Strategy described how the U.S. military was to defend the homeland and retain its competitive advantage to deter competitors and defeat adversaries, whether great power competitors like China and Russia or from other security challenges. It was a fundamental departure from other National Military Strategies post-September 11, 2001, which focused on counterinsurgency and defeating violent extremist organizations. In essence, the 2018 National Military Strategy refocused the Army from fighting counterinsurgencies and violent extremist organizations to countering and possibly confronting Russian and Chinese military forces. The Army's 2020 AimPoint initiative was intended to be the means by which to build the force structure needed to implement the 2018 National Military Strategy's new focus. Previous Arrmy Force Structure Construct During the Cold War, the U.S. Army was primarily a division-centric force whereby divisions, consisting of a mix of specialized brigades, battalions, and companies, were the primary warfighting organization. Within the division, the commander controlled a variety of assets such as artillery, engineers, and logistical units that could be assigned to subordinate infantry or armored brigades as the tactical situation required. Divisions were part of corps, which also had their own organic units such as artillery and engineers that the corps commander could allocate to divisions to support operations. In the early 2000s, as the Army became committed to long- term counterinsurgency combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army units would rotate in and out of these theaters on an annual basis. Based on observations of how these rotations affected soldiers and units, Army leadership determined that the division-centric force was not the best structure to support a rotational force. In September 2003, the U.S. Army began converting from an organization centered on divisions (numbering from 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers) to a force based upon brigade combat teams (BCTs) of around 4,000 soldiers. This new brigade-centric force, known as the modular force, assigned a number of division-level assets to the newly formed BCTs, thereby lessening the operational and tactical roles of the division. Muti-Domain Operations (MDO) According to the Army, current conventional warfighting doctrine is still largely based on the Air-Land Battle concept developed in 1981 to counter Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. As the name indicates, Air-Land Battle is primarily based on operations in the air and land domains. However, competitors now possess increasingly capable anti-access and area denial strategies, meant to separate the Joint Force physically and functionally and alliances politically. Furthermore, near-peer competitors are capable of securing strategic objectives by means other than armed conflict with the United States and its allies. More importantly, the Army can no longer guarantee dominance over a near-peer threat-an advantage that the United States has held for decades. Unlike Air-Land Battle, MDO addresses the notion that competition and conflict occur in multiple domains (land, air, sea, cyber, and space). The Army intends to achieve a full MDO capability by 2035. Major Aspects of Aim Point Force Structure In itative The primary means by which the Army intended to build its MDO capability was through what it called the AimPoint Force Structure Initiative. The AimPoint Force developed by the Army Futures Command's (AFC's) Army Futures and Concepts Center was to be a flexible force structure. While little change was expected at brigade level and below, the Army suggested major changes would occur at higher echelons-division, corps, and theater command. Under MDO, higher field headquarters would be required to take the lead in coordinating large-scale campaigns against well-armed nation-states such as Russia and China. Because of the geographic distinctions between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, individual higher- echelon AimPoint formation force structure might differ by theater as opposed to current one-size-fits-all units. Major Proposed Force Structure nitatives The following sections provide a description of some of AimPoint's major proposed force structure changes. Division, Corps, and Theater Level The Army notes that over the past 20 to 30 years, the capacity to conduct campaigns at the division, corps, and theater level was mortgaged (i.e., assets and units at these levels were assigned to BCTs). Under AimPoint, headquarters at these levels would be developed and existing ones modified to build back a campaign capability (i.e., adding additional staff, specialists, capabilities, and units) to compete with near-peer adversaries and to employ information warfare and operate in the cyber and space domains. As part of AimPoint, the Army announced on February 11, 2020, the activation of a fourth corps headquarters, designated Fifth Corps (V Corps) located at Fort Knox, KY.

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