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1 1 (February 28, 2022)

handle is hein.crs/govefim0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional .Research Service ~ ~~ i~nforming the legisI five d bate since 1914___________________ Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects February 28, 2022 Prior to February 24, 2022, Russian President Putin gave signals of impending aggression against Ukraine. For example, on February 21, 2022, Putin announced that Russia would recognize the independence of two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, or DNR/LNR). Russian recognition appeared to include the entire regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, most of which had remained under Ukrainian control since Russia's first invasion of parts of Ukraine in 2014. Shortly thereafter, Putin announced Russia would send peacekeepers into the DNR/LNR to defend against fabricated charges of Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage attempts. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around Ukraine. The attack began after Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel on the Ukrainian border, in Belarus, and in Ukraine's occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates. Russia's invasion follows months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration, European allies, NATO, and Members of Congress. Russia's Invasion of Ukraine On February 24, Putin announced in a televised address a special military operation to protect the civilian population and to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine (the latter term understood by many observers as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government). Hours after Putin's speech, the invasion began with a massed aerospace attack against key targets, including logistics centers, naval installations, command and control centers, air defenses and critical infrastructure. Russia initiated large-scale precision guided missile (PGM) and rocket artillery attacks across Ukraine. In the initial attack, the Pentagon stated that Russia launched over 100 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Some observers believe Russia's initial strategy was to achieve air superiority, degrade Ukrainian air defenses, and undermine the Ukrainian military's ability to coordinate defenses and counterattacks. This initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration and scale than some analysts expected and did not establish full air superiority. After the aerospace assault, Russian ground forces attacked from multiple directions: north from occupied Crimea in the direction of Kherson; limited incursions west from DNR/LNR; from Russia's Belgorod and Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov IN11872 CRS INSIGHT Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

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