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                                                                                       Updated January 15, 2021

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations


Military operations, both in peacetime and in war, are an
inherently complex undertaking. One key to success,
therefore, is a clear, unified chain of command. This
enables senior leaders in the U.S. government-in
particular, the President and the Secretary of Defense-to
command  and control military forces around the world.

A (Very)  Brief History of the Chain of Command
The way that the United States commands and controls its
forces is in large part a product of an inherent tension
between improving the effectiveness of U.S. forces, on the
one hand, and preserving civilian control of the military, on
the other. The experience of World War II convinced
President Truman, among others, that a greater degree of
coordination and integration between the U.S. military
services was necessary to improve the conduct of military
operations. Yet there was concern at the time that
integrating these institutions might result in an overly
powerful military staff element that could threaten the
principle of civilian control of U.S. forces.

The resulting compromise was to create a Joint Chiefs of
Staff, comprising all the military service chiefs, and headed
by a Chairman, serving as an advisory body only. As a
corporate body, it was specifically not designed to exercise
command;  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
had no command  authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did,
however, have responsibility for establishing unified
combatant commands,  which were charged with executing
military operations in different parts of the world and
combining the capabilities of two or more military services.
Different service chiefs were assigned executive and
administrative responsibilities for these combatant
commands,  which gave them a de facto mechanism through
which they could influence ongoing military operations.
By 1953, the authority to establish Combatant Commands
(COCOMs)   was assigned to the Secretary of Defense,
although the relative ambiguity of the chain of command
remained a feature of DOD operations until 1986.

Perceived shortcomings in the U.S. chain of command led
to demonstrable failures during several incidents in the late
1970s and early 1980s. The military services, in the view of
many  observers, failed to effectively plan or conduct
operations jointly due to confusion over whether the
military services or unified combatant commanders were
ultimately in charge of operations. These incidents include
the operation in Grenada; the Iranian hostage rescue attempt
(often referred to as Desert One); and the bombing of the
Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In 1986, Congress
passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act (P.L.
99-433), which mandated clarifications to the chain of
command.  The current command and control architecture
for DOD  is a product of these congressionally mandated
changes.


The  Chain  of Command
Title 10 U.S.C. §162 specifies that the chain of command
for military operations goes from the President, to the
Secretary of Defense, to Commanders of Combatant
Commands.  The Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts
as an intermediary, transmitting orders between the
Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of Combatant
Commands.  Each Combatant  Commander  is a four-star
Flag or General Officer, whose appointment is confirmed
by the Senate.

Unified Command Plan (UCP)
The UCP  is a classified executive branch document that
articulates how DOD assigns responsibility for different
missions and areas of the world. It is prepared by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff every two years and
approved by the President. Each UCP sets forth basic
guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes
their missions, responsibilities, and force structure;
delineates the general geographical area of responsibility
for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies
functional responsibilities for functional combatant
commanders.  Congress is not included in this review
process but does have visibility into issues affecting UCP
development. It is through the UCP that the Department of
Defense develops its global map of areas of responsibilities
for its Combatant Commanders, reflected below.

Figure I. Combatant  Commanders' Area of
Responsibility


Source: U.S. Department of Defense. Of note, USPACOM is now
referred to as USINDOPACOM.

The  Combatant   Commands Today
A COCOM is   a military command with broad continuing
missions under a single commander and composed of
significant assigned components of two or more military
departments. There are currently eleven Combatant
Commands.  The COCOMs,   and by extension their
commanders, have responsibility for the military's


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