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October 8, 2020
President Reagan's Six Assurances to Taiwan
In July 1982, as his government negotiated with the
People's Republic of China (PRC) over a joint communiqud
on Taiwan arms sales, President Ronald Reagan offered
Taiwan assurances about what the United States had not
agreed to in those negotiations. These statements have
come to be known as the Six Assurances. (See Table 1
below.) A senior Reagan Administration official wove
language from the assurances through his testimony before
Congress on August 17, 1982, the day of the communiqu6's
release, but successive administrations kept the precise text
of the assurances classified, creating lingering uncertainties
about their content. With its declassification of an internal
1982 presidential memorandum (in 2019) and two 1982
State Department cables (in 2020), the Trump
Administration has made public definitive language for the
Six Assurances, as well as new information about the
context in which they were offered.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs David R. Stilwell has portrayed the declassification
decisions as part of an effort to bolster Taiwan and prevent
and reverse [the] PRC's squeezing of ... Taiwan's
international space. Declassification has also served to
refocus attention on the 1982 U.S.-PRC joint communiqu6
on Taiwan arms sales and to affirm a long-standing U.S.
policy of taking no position on Taiwan's sovereignty.
T 1h, e '82 U.,-R Jon Co n ° .... .
Between 1972 and 1982, the United States and the PRC
agreed to three joint communiquds, each of which included
significant language related to Taiwan. The PRC views the
communiqu6s as the political foundation for the U.S.-PRC
relationship. The United States views them as an element of
its one-China policy, under which the United States since
1979 has recognized the PRC as the sole legal government
of China while maintaining unofficial relations with
Taiwan. (A second major element of the U.S. one-China
policy is the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted on April 10, 1979.)
The third U.S.-PRC joint communiqu6, released on August
17, 1982, sought to settle differences between the United
States and the PRC over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In it,
the PRC affirmed a fundamental policy of striving for a
peaceful reunification with Taiwan, over which the PRC
claims sovereignty. The United States stated that it
understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving
for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. With
those statements in mind, the United States stated
that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy
of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to
Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied [since
1979], and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale
of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time, to
a final resolution.
The joint communiqu6 angered Taiwan. After its release,
Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement
accusing the U.S. government of having mistaken the
fallacious 'peaceful intention' of the Chinese communists
as sincere and meaningful, and expressing profound
regret. The joint communiqu6 later became a point of
contention in U.S.-PRC relations, too. The PRC accuses the
United States of violating the communiqu6 by not reducing
its arms sales to Taiwan.
The U.S. government presents arms sales to Taiwan as
consistent with the TRA, which states that the United States
will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability. The United States also argues that its
commitments in the 1982 joint communiqu6 were
predicated on the PRC's continued commitment to peaceful
resolution of its sovereignty dispute with Taiwan, and that
PRC military intimidation of Taiwan since has called the
PRC's peaceful intentions into question. To emphasize the
linkage, the Trump Administration in 2019 declassified an
internal presidential memorandum Reagan issued on the
day of the third communiqu6's release. Reagan wrote, the
U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is
conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of
China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC
differences. He added that, it is essential that the quantity
and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned
entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.
Th- i Asorance,,
More than a month before the 1982 joint communiqud's
release, the United States sought to ease Taiwan anxieties
about its possible provisions. In a newly declassified July
10, 1982, cable, then-Under Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger instructed James Lilley, Director of the
American Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial U.S.
representative office in Taiwan, to seek a meeting with
Taiwan President Chiang Ching-kuo. The cable provided
Lilley with talking points authorized by President Reagan,
including what later came to be known as the Six
Assurances. Lilley delivered them on July 14, 1982.
Taiwan subsequently requested U.S. permission to make
the Six Assurances public. In a newly declassified cable
sent on August 17, 1982 the day the third communique
was issued then-Secretary of State George Schultz
provided Lilley with a version of the Six Assurances for
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