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Updated October 15, 2020
International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or weapons
designed to independently select and engage targets without
the need for manual human control, could enable military
operations in communications-degraded or -denied
environments where traditional systems may not be able to
operate. LAWS are not yet in widespread development.
However, as technology advances particularly artificial
intelligence (Al) a larger number of countries may
consider developing and operating LAWS. This could hold
potential implications for congressional oversight, defense
investments, military concepts of operations, treaty-making,
and the future of warfare.
As has been the case throughout history, incorporation of
new technology into weapons systems creates a number of
potential legal, ethical, strategic, and operational problems.
For this reason, some members of the international
community seek through international discussions to
constrain-if not ban LAWS.
Wh t: Ar LAWS'?
Definitions. No single, universally accepted definition of
LAWS is used in international discussions. However,
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, which
establishes U.S. policy on autonomy in weapons systems,
defines LAWS as weapon system[s] that, once activated,
can select and engage targets without further intervention
by a human operator. This definition's principal
characteristic, then is the role of the human operator with
regard to target selection and engagement decisions.
Other countries such as the United Kingdom, however,
have grounded their definition of LAWS on different
characteristics, in particular the technological sophistication
of the weapon system, such that LAWS are considered to
be weapon systems capable of human-level cognition. Still
others do not believe that a definition of LAWS is
required or desirable for international discussions.
Despite these differences, most parties to the LAWS
discussions generally agree that the defining features of
LAWS include full autonomy (no manual human control of
the system) and the potential to produce lethal effects.
Status. Although the pursuit of LAWS is not yet
widespread, some analysts have argued that Israel's Harpy
loitering munition which the weapon's manufacturer, IAI,
describes as being fully autonomous-qualifies. Israel has
exported the Harpy to Chile, China, India, South Korea, and
Turkey. Similarly, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has
noted that Chinese manufacturer Ziyan has advertised a
fully autonomous system, the Blowfish A3 helicopter
drone, which it has reportedly exported to the Middle East.
In addition, according to a report by the Defense Innovation
Board, the United States developed LAWS during the
1980s but no longer has LAWS in its inventory.
tor LAWs'S §.~r
The international community examines the implications of
LAWS in discussions held primarily under the auspices of
the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW), a multilateral arms control agreement to
which the United States became a party in 1982. The
CCW's purpose is to ban or restrict the use of specific
types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary
or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians
indiscriminately.
Since 2014, the CCW has convened annual meetings of
States Parties, observers, and members of civil society to
discuss the legal, ethical, technological, and military facets
of LAWS. These meetings were elevated in 2017 from
informal Meetings of Experts to a formal Group of
Government Experts (GGE). After each session of the
GGE, the session's chair produces a draft report that details
session proceedings and offers conclusions and
recommendations for future work. States Parties then adopt
the final report by consensus.
In 2018, States Parties additionally agreed to a set of
guiding principles for LAWS. States Parties agreed that
international humanitarian law (IHL) would apply to
LAWS, that humans must remain responsible for decisions
about the use of force, and that states must consider the
risks of LAWS acquisition by, or proliferation to, terrorists.
Table I. State Stances on Preemptive LAWS Ban
Sup ort Opposeb Otherc
Algeria Guatemala Australia China
Argentina Holy See France
Austria Iraq Germany
Bolivia Jordan Israel
Brazil Mexico New Zealand
Chile Morocco Russia
Colombia Namibia South Korea
Costa Rica Nicaragua Spain
Cuba Pakistan Turkey
Djibouti Panama United Kingdom
Ecuador Peru United States
Egypt- Uganda
El Salvador Venezuela
Ghana, Zimbabwe,
Source: CRS consolidation of data from multiple sources.
Notes: CCW discussions on LAWS exclude existing weapons
systems. Therefore, States Parties consider any potential LAWS ban
to be preemptive.
a. State is not party to the CCW.
b. States that oppose a preemptive LAWS ban do not necessarily
share the same alternative approach to managing LAWS.
c. See section below on China.
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