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1 1 (September 16, 2020)

handle is hein.crs/govdbwe0001 and id is 1 raw text is: xa S 1,k Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) Over the last decade, Russian private military companies (PMCs) have appeared globally in various conflicts. Observers believe theRussiangovernment is increasingly using PMCs to project power cheaply and deniably. Russian PMCs often operate alongside local militias, volunteers, criminal groups, and other non-state actors. In many cases, such PMCs appear closely connected to and controlled by the Russian government; in other cases, the extent of government controlis uncertain. Members of Congress may be interestedin examining the scope of Russian PMC operations to understand the fullrange of Russian tactics and operations when evaluating Russia's efforts to advance its foreign policy. During the 1990s, Rus sia experienced an increase in internal demand for security services, which resulted in the growth of a large domestic private protection industry. The fall of the USSR left many former soldiers, members of elite special forces, andintelligence professionals jobless; many of these former soldiers formed as sociations with veterans of their old units and created new private security companies. Gradually, these firms and as sociations began to look internationally forbusiness but were met with stiff competition fromWestern private security companies. Additionally, a 1996 law forbade Russian citizens from participating in armed conflict abroadforfmancialgain. PMCs ostensibly remain illegal under Ru s sian law, despite several attempts to passlegislation that would give them legal status. Observers suggest this may be dueto opposition fromthe official security services and sections of the military, which seekto ensure Russians ecurity agencies retain control over theseprivate actors and manage competition fromthem. By 2010, several internationally focused, operational Russian private security companies, primarily run by former military and security service officers, appeared to have close connections with the Ministry of Defense. Initially, these companies offered traditional training and protection services for private firms, including anti-piracy services. Often these groups worked for, orhad connections to, Russian state-run oil and gas co mpanies. Gradually, new companies were formed that emphasized combatservices, which included not only training and coordinating local forces but also participating in direct combat. This combat- oriented focus constitutes a main difference between Russian PMCs andWestern security contractors, which tend to focus onlogistics and support. The type, extent, and competency of Rus sian PMCs appear to vary widely both across and within conflicts. Information on these groups and their activities is often imprecise. Sonr personnel are highly experienced and trained ex-members ofRus sia's elite forces orintelligence services. Others appear to be less qualified or trained and reportedly are paid significantly less. Analysts have reported instances of qualified, experienced Russian PMC personnel being used for specific operations and then gradually replaced by less competent personnel. Multiple Russian PMCs are registered both domestically and internationally, including in Cyprus and Hong Kong. Often companies are dissolved and reconstituted under new management and names, often to obscure their true ownership. The most well-known PMC is the Wagner Group (and entities related to it), allegedly financed and operated by wealthy s tate-connected businessman Yevgeny Prighozin (through his holding company, Concord Management and Consulting). The U.S. govenment has imposed sanctions on Prigozhin, the Wagner Group, and/or related individuals andentities for actions tied to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, U.S. election interference, and support to the forner governmentofSudan. Mediareporting suggests the Wagner Group and its related entities maintain close connections to Russia's military intelligence agency (GU). Reporting alsohas identified Wagner training camps close to the b ases ofRu s sian spetsnaz(special forces) brigades. Other firms appear to have close connections to Rus sia's Ministry ofDefense and other state security services. In some cases, tensions between PMC outfits and their security service or military patrons reportedly have resulted in infighting and arrests. A defining feature of Rus sian PMCs is the blending of private and Russian state interests. For example, the U.S. Treasury Department identifies the Wagner Group as a designated Russian Ministry of Defence proxy force despite it allegedly being operated by a private citizen. The Rus s ian govenment initially us ed PMCs extensively during its invasion of Ukraine and its intervention in Syria. As the role of PMCs increased, the political and economic power of their owners also increased. Over time, and as the Russian government's needs changed, Russian PMCs apparently began to pursue more commercially beneficial opportunities les s directly connected to Russian foreign policy objectives. Some analysts argue that, in some cases, PMC owner/operators are pursuing financialopportunities in exchange for carrying out Russian statedirectives. R,,.,, L k,, P M C D'oc It ' ., e k , d k':a e 4 The rise ofRus sian PMCs coincided with developments in Russian military doctrine and strategy concerning theuse and role of non-state actors in conflict. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Russia relies on a highly A A '2 September 16, 2020

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