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Who Pays the Corporate Tax?


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    September 29, 2017


Among the issues surrounding tax reform is who bears the
burden of the corporate tax. The burden could fall on
stockholders, on capital owners in general, or on labor. This
question is important for characterizing the distributional
effects of the tax. If the tax reduces the returns to capital, it
falls largely on higher-income individuals who own
relatively more of capital assets and is progressive (i.e., the
tax rises as a share of income as income rises). If it reduces
wages, it falls on workers and it is less likely to be
progressive.

A considerable amount of economic research has appeared,
especially in the past 10 or 15 years, examining the
incidence of the tax. That research is reviewed in detail in
CRS Report RL34229, Corporate Tax Reform: Issues for
Congress, by Jane G. Gravelle. That review suggests that
the evidence supports most or all of the burden falling on
capital.

Sometimes claims are made that the tax falls on the
corporation's customers (and by implication on purchases
in the economy). Only relative and not absolute prices
matter in determining burden and aggregate real prices
cannot rise in the economy due to taxes. A corporate tax
would raise the prices of corporate goods but at the same
time lower the price of noncorporate goods, with the overall
effect on prices zero. Therefore, economic research has
focused on which factor of production (labor or capital)
bears the burden, which is the more important issue for
distributional issues.

This research reflects two different approaches to empirical
estimates of the burden: embedding behavioral responses in
a general equilibrium model and reduced-form statistical
estimates.




Since the 1960s, the standard approach to studying the
corporate tax burden was through a general equilibrium
model. The model that prevailed for many years was one
with a closed economy with a fixed capital stock. This
model shows that the burden falls on capital. The corporate
tax causes the return in the corporate sector to fall, and
capital moves out of that sector and into the noncorporate
sector. The contraction of the capital stock in the corporate
sector causes the rate of return before tax to rise, restoring
some of the original after-tax return, whereas the abundance
in the noncorporate sector causes the rate of return to fall,
spreading the burden to other capital income. It also causes
prices to rise in the corporate sector and fall in the
noncorporate sector. With a reasonable set of empirical
assumptions, wages were largely unaffected and the burden
fell around 100% on capital (both corporate and


noncorporate). It could slightly exceed 100% or slightly fall
short, but was always close to 100%.

Economists then began applying the model to an open
economy in which the tax could cause the capital stock to
contract because capital could flow out to other countries.
An important advantage of a model is that it can set the
limits of what might be expected. The first, simplest,
models suggested that significant taxes could fall on labor.

In the case of a small open economy with one good and
with perfect capital mobility (i.e., investment flows to the
highest rate of return regardless of location) and where
foreign and domestic products are perfect substitutes, the
full burden of the tax falls on labor income. Capital flows
out of the country to the rest of the world causing the pre-
tax return to rise and because prices must remain fixed (due
to perfect product substitution) and capital owners must
earn their original after-tax return, only the wage rate
adjusts, falling enough to offset the rise in the pre-tax
return.

These are strict assumptions; as they are relaxed, the burden
is more likely to shift to capital. For example, applying the
model to a larger economy causes part of the burden to fall
on capital.

Empirical evidence also suggests that capital is not
perfectly mobile (i.e., investing abroad is not a perfect
substitute for investing at home). Relaxing that assumption
causes a larger share to fall on capital as capital cannot
move as easily. Similarly, making foreign products
imperfect substitutes for domestic products makes the
economy less open and, again, causes more of the burden to
fall on capital. Overall, using values from the empirical
literature for the three major behavioral effects (how easily
substitutable capital is across jurisdictions, how easily
substitutable foreign products are for domestic ones, and
how easily capital can be substituted for labor in
production), as well as how capital intensive the corporate-
tradable sector is compared with the economy as a whole,
labor appears to bear between 20% and 40% of the burden;
hence, the majority falls on capital.

This analysis likely still places too much of the burden on
labor for several reasons. First, some share of the profit that
generates taxes is in the form of rents with the burden borne
entirely by stockholders. Although little evidence is
available on the share of rent, that evidence suggests a share
of 10% to 20%. This share suggests a range of 15% to 36%
falling on labor.

Strictly speaking, the analysis applies only to a source-
based (territorial) tax in which the U.S. corporate tax
applies only to profits earned in the United States. The U.S.


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