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1 1 (August 8, 2019)

handle is hein.crs/govbarz0001 and id is 1 raw text is: I Congressional Research Service ~Info rming te Veslat've debate since 1914 August 8, 2019 Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems Russia targeted state and local systems as part of its effort to interfere with the 2016 elections, according to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Reports of Russia's activities highlighted the potential for threats to the technologies, facilities, and processes used to administer elections. Congress has responded to such threats, in part, by providing and proposing funding to help secure elections. This In Focus offers an overview of federal funding for securing election systems. It starts with some background on potential threats to state and local election systems and then summarizes the funding Congress has provided and proposed to help secure those systems. Background Elections-related systems in all 50 states were likely targeted in the 2016 election cycle, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) suggested in a July 2019 report. Some attempts to access state and local systems succeeded. Russian actors reportedly extracted voter data from the statewide voter registration database in one state, for example, and breached county systems in another. Multiple techniques were used to target state and local election systems in the 2016 cycle. Attackers tried to access voter registration databases by entering malicious code in the data fields of state or local websites, for example, and to obtain access to county systems by sending emails to election officials with malware attached. Election systems may also be vulnerable to other types of attack. Hacked election office websites or social media accounts might be used to disseminate misinformation, for example. Malware might be spread among non-internet- connected voting machines, computer scientist J. Alex Halderman has testified, in the course of programming the machines with ballot designs. Individuals with access to election storage facilities might tamper with voting equipment. Some threats to election systems may also be compounded by the structure of U.S. election administration. States, territories, and localities-which have primary responsibility for conducting elections in the United States-use different election equipment and processes and have varying levels of access to security resources and expertise. This decentralization may help guard against large-scale, coordinated attacks, but it also offers potential attackers multiple possible points of entry, some of which may be less well defended than others. Limited attacks on less well defended jurisdictions might undermine voters' confidence in the legitimacy of the https:!crsrepo election process or the winners it produces. In some cases, some have suggested, such small-scale attacks might also be able to change election outcomes. Appropriated Funding States, territories, and localities have primary responsibility for ensuring that election systems are secure, but federal agencies also play a role in helping identify and address election system threats and vulnerabilities. Congress has provided election system security funding both to states, territories, and the District of Columbia (DC) and to federal agencies since the 2016 elections. Funding for States The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115- 141) included $380 million for payments to the 50 states, DC, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (referred to herein as states) under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; 52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145). The FY2018 payments were appropriated under provisions of HAVA that authorize payments to states for general improvements to the administration of federal elections. The explanatory statement accompanying the FY2018 bill listed the following as acceptable uses of the funding: * replacing paperless voting machines, * conducting postelection audits, * addressing cyber vulnerabilities in election systems, * providing election officials with cybersecurity training, * instituting election system cybersecurity best practices, and * making other improvements to the security of federal elections. Each state was guaranteed a minimum payment under the FY2018 appropriations bill, with some eligible for additional funds based on voting-age population (see Figure 1). The 50 states, DC, and Puerto Rico are required to provide a 5% match for the federal funds they receive, and all funding recipients were asked to submit their plans for the payments to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and report each year on how they spend their funds. According to the EAC, which is charged with administering the FY2018 HAVA payments, all of the available funds were requested by July 16, 2018, and disbursed to the states by September 20, 2018. States spent at least $108.14 million of the $380 million total by the end of April 2019, the agency reported to the House Committee on House Administration in July 2019. 0 sqconcss- S

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