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1 (March 18, 2005)

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                                                                Order Code  RS21391
                                                              Updated March  18, 2005



 CRS Report for Congress

               Received through the CRS Web



          North Korea's Nuclear Weapons:
                   How Soon an Arsenal?

                          Sharon  A. Squassoni
                      Specialist in National Defense
               Foreign Affairs, Defense and  Trade Division

Summary


     North Korea ended the eight-year-old freeze on its nuclear program in December
 2002, expelling international inspectors and restarting its plutonium production
 facilities. Before 2002, the CIA estimated that North Korea might have enough
 plutonium (Pu) for 1 or 2 weapons. If the 8000 spent fuel rods at Yongbyon, which had
 previously been under seal, were successfully reprocessed in 2003, as North Korean
 officials claim, North Korea would have enough Pu for 6 or 8 weapons. The new fuel
 at the Yongbyon reactor could yield enough material for 3 more weapons by 2007. An
 unknown factor is the status of North Korea's uranium enrichment efforts, particularly
 given the aid of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. This report will be updated as warranted.

 Background

    In the early1980s, U.S. satellites tracked a growing indigenous nuclear program in
North Korea. A small nuclear reactor at Yongbyon (5MWe), capable of producing about
6kg of plutonium per year, began operating in 1986.1 Later that year, U.S. satellites
detected high explosives testing and a new plant to separate plutonium (a necessary step
before turning the plutonium into metal for a warhead). In addition, the construction of
two larger reactors (50MWe at Yongbyon and 200MWe  at Taechon) added to the
mounting evidence of a serious clandestine effort. Although North Korea had joined the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, safeguards inspections began only in 1992.
Those inspections raised questions about how much plutonium North Korea had produced
covertly that still have not been resolved. In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the
Agreed Framework  with the United States, to freeze its plutonium programs and
eventually dismantle them in return for several kinds of assistance.2 At that time, Western
intelligence agencies estimated that North Korea had separated enough plutonium for one
to two bombs; other sources claimed it was enough for 4-5 bombs.



1 5MWe is a power rating for the reactor, indicating that it produces 5 million watts of electricity
per day (very small). Reactors are also described in terms of million watts of heat (MW thermal).
2 See CRS Issue Brief 1B91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program.

       Congressional  Research  Service  4- The Library of Congress

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