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1980 AEI Economist 1 (1980)

handle is hein.amenin/aeieco1980 and id is 1 raw text is: 



the a economist
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,      January 1980


National Security and the Economy


                    Herbert  Stein


In the golden age, thirty years ago, we were all certain
that the U.S. economy made a decisive contribution to
our national security. This contribution came in
several ways:
   The unequalled productive capacity of the United
States would enable us to support a defense force that
no one else could match. We could afford the defense
we required and still satisfy the nondefense needs of
our population on a scale never before imagined.
  *  We  could provide the economic assistance to
build up the capabilities of those countries that shared
our national security interests, which meant, essen-
tially, Western Europe.
    We could limit the economic development of our
enemies-the  Communists-by  denying them  access
to goods and technology that we controlled.
    We  were invulnerable to external economic
pressure because we had within our borders almost all
the resources needed for our economic growth.
  * We  could provide economic assistance to the less
developed, and nonaligned, countries which would
help to create stability within and among them and to
make them  friendly toward us or, at least, desirous of
maintaining our friendship toward them.
    The obvious success of our political-economic
system in meeting the needs of our population would
make other countries want to emulate us, which would
be a force for peace and friendship with us. In the end,
the attractiveness of our economic performance might
even induce in the Soviet Union changes of internal
and external policy which would reduce its threat to us.
  This confidence in our economy as the bulwark of
our national security began to erode in the 1960s, and
the process of erosion speeded up in the 1970s. Al-
though defense expenditures as a share of the gross na-
tional product (GNP) or of the budget declined, argu-
ment over whether we could afford those expenditures
became  more acute. Our foreign policy became in-
creasingly dominated by fear of an interruption of oil


supplies from abroad. The greatly increased economic
strength of Western Europe and Japan, which we had
fostered, made them more independent of us politi-
cally and raised new sources of friction. In an effort to
obtain trade advantages, we felt obliged to relax trade

The loss of confidence in the economy, over the
course of thirty years, coincided with the change in the
national mood from 'We can!' to 'We can't!'

restrictions against the Communist countries, which
we had thought were of national security advantage to
us. We came to expect popular movements around the
world to be anti-Western and anti-capitalist.
  The  low point in this decline of confidence was
probably reached around the first half of 1979. The
economy  had come to be regarded not as a source of
strength but as a source of weakness and vulnerability.
The loss of confidence in the economy, over the course
of thirty years, coincided with the change in the
national mood from We can! to We can't!
  Undoubtedly, there was much that was naive and
shortsighted in our view of the economics of national
security thirty years ago. We were looking at a balance
of world economic power which resulted in part from
the war devastation of Europe and Asia and which
could not be expected to last. Our own independence
of imported supplies was an unusual situation for a
major power and would diminish, especially as our own
growth increased our demand for raw materials and
our own policy promoted open exchange. Our notions
of the connections between economic aid and eco-
nomic  development, and between development and
political solidarity, were too simple.
  But, still, the reaction to a feeling of economic
weakness went too far. What we should have learned is
not that our economy   is weak or that economic
strength doesn't matter but that economic strength is


The AEI Economist/

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